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Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical
Adjudication: An Empirical Study of
Investment Treaty Arbitration
GUS VAN HARTEN *
The study examines arbitrator behaviour in the unique context of investment treaty arbitration.
It employs the method of content analysis to test hypotheses of systemic bias in the resolution
of jurisdictional issues in investment treaty law. Unlike earlier studies, the study examines
trends in legal interpretation instead of case outcomes and ﬁnds statistically signiﬁcant evidence
that arbitrators favour: (1) the position of claimants over respondent states and (2) the
position of claimants from major Western capital-exporting states over claimants from other
states. There is a range of possible explanations for the results and further inferences are
required to connect the observed trends to rationales for systemic bias. The key ﬁnding is
that the observed trends exist and that they are unlikely to be explained by chance. This gives
tentative empirical evidence of cause for concern about the use of arbitration in this context.
Cette étude se penche sur le comportement de l’arbitre dans le contexte particulier de
l’arbitrage des traités d’investissement. Elle recourt à la méthode de l’analyse du contenu aﬁn
de vériﬁer les hypothèses du biais systémique dans la résolution des questions de compétence
judiciaire à l’égard du droit des traités d’investissement. Contrairement aux études antérieures, cette étude examine les tendances en matière d’interprétation juridique plutôt que
l’issue des procédures et démontre de manière statistiquement signiﬁcative que les arbitres
favorisent : (1) la position des États requérants par rapport à celle des États intimés, et (2)
la position des requérants des principaux États exportateurs de capital de l’Ouest rapport
à celle des requérants d’autres États. Il existe une vaste gamme d’explications plausibles
pour les résultats et d’autres inférences sont nécessaires afin de pourvoir relier les
tendances observées aux justiﬁcations du biais systémique. La principale conclusion est que
les tendances observées existent et qu’il est fort peu probable qu’elles soient le fruit du
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hasard. Cela semble démontrer empiriquement qu’il y a lieu de s’inquiéter de l’utilisation de
l’arbitrage dans ce contexte.
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THE TAKE-OFF OF INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION marked a transformation

in international dispute settlement. Since the late 1990s, the system has generated
hundreds of claims by investors and numerous awards and orders against states.
Tis has prompted debate about the role of investment treaties and their policy
implications, raising issues of fairness and independence that are integral to the
legitimizing role of investment arbitration.1 Some observers argue that the system
1.

See José Augusto Fontoura Costa, “Comparing WTO Panelists and ICSID Arbitrators: the
Creation of International Legal Fields” (2011) 1:4 Oñati Socio-Legal Series at 3; Catherine A
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ofers a neutral and impartial forum in which to resolve investor-state disputes as
a basis for protecting foreign-owned assets and ensuring the rule of law.2 Others
claim that the arbitration mechanism favours investors and Western capitalexporting states at the expense of respondent governments, especially governments
in the developing world.3 Te debate has been framed as a matter of policy,
doctrine, or theory. However, it also points to a role for empirical methods to
collect and analyze information on arbitrator decision making.4
In this study, expectations of potential bias were examined by drawing on
literature on judicial behaviour and on recent empirical studies of the investment
treaty system. Te intention was to focus on whether there is evidence that the
resolution of contested issues of jurisdiction and admissibility in investment treaty
law has been infuenced by apparent fnancial or career interests of arbitrators or
by wider economic aims of the arbitration industry. Te study thus draws
primarily on an economic model of adjudicative behaviour in the unique context
of investment treaty arbitration. Tis context is unique because it appears to be
the only modern form of adjudication that leads to the fnal resolution of individual claims against states, in their sovereign capacity, by way of an asymmetrical
claims structure,5 without mediation by domestic courts and with limited scope
for judicial review. Tis context for adjudication invites empirical study in its own
right, but also as a case study for the expansion of arbitration into new realms.6

2.

3.

4.
5.
6.

Rogers, “Te Vocation of the International Arbitrator” (2005) 20:5 Am U Int’l L Rev 957 at
1006-07 [Rogers, “Vocation”].
Jan Paulsson, Denial of Justice in International Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 2005) at 265; Tomas W Wälde, “Te Present State of Research Carried Out by
the English-Speaking Section of the Centre for Studies and Research” in Phillipe Kahn &
Tomas W Wälde, eds, New Aspects of International Investment Law (Te Hague: Hague
Academy of International Law, 2007); and Charles N Brower & Stephan W Schill, “Is
Arbitration a Treat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of International Investment Law?” (2009)
9:2 Chicago J Int’l L 471.
Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, “Who Wins and Who Loses in Investment Arbitration?
Are Investors and Host States on a Level Playing Field? Te Lauder/Czech Republic Legacy”
(2005) 6:1 J World Inv’t & Trade 69; Olivia Chung, “Te Lopsided International Investment
Law Regime and Its Efect on the Future of Investor-State Arbitration” (2007) 47:4 Va J Int’l
L 953; and Ibironke T Odumosu, “Te Antinomies of the (Continued) Relevance of ICSID
to the Tird World” (2007) 8:2 San Diego Int’l LJ 345.
Bryant G Garth, “Observations On An Uncomfortable Relationship: Civil Procedure and
Empirical Research” (1997) 49:1 Ala L Rev 103 at 113.
See below in Part I(A).
Alexander JS Colvin, “An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes
and Processes” (2011) 8:1 J Empirical Legal Stud 1; Christopher R Drahozal, “Judicial
Incentives and the Appeals Process” (1998) 51:3 SMU L Rev 469 at 501 [Drahozal,
“Judicial Incentives”].
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Te study is based on a systematic content analysis7 of all publicly available
awards (i.e., decisions) dealing with jurisdictional matters in 140 known cases
under investment treaties until May 2010. Te awards were coded for resolutions
by the arbitrators of a series of legal issues of jurisdiction and admissibility that
were contested in existing awards or secondary literature. Te coded data were
used to test three hypotheses developed based on theoretical expectations about
arbitrator interests arising from the system’s structure. Two signifcant tendencies
were observed.8 Te frst was a strong tendency toward expansive resolutions that
enhanced the compensatory promise of the system for claimants and, in turn, the
risk of liability for respondent states. Te second was an accentuated tendency
toward expansive resolutions where the claimant was from a Western capitalexporting state. Tis accentuated tendency was present on a statistically signifcant
basis in cases brought by claimants from the United Kingdom, the United States,
and France—with cases brought up by German claimants as a possible
exception—and was supported by additional analyses of other groupings associated
with Western capital-exporting states. It was most apparent in cases under a
bilateral investment treaty (BIT) or the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT),9 for certain
jurisdictional issues, and for resolutions by frequently appointed arbitrators.
Te study difers from others that have examined possible bias in investment
arbitration. First, other studies have analyzed case outcomes rather than legal
content. Second, although they have produced useful and interesting fndings,
other studies have not generated any reliable evidence based on specifc hypotheses
and, in some cases, have overstated their conclusions. Tis study adopts a more
cautious approach10 by limiting its reported fndings to evidence found to be
statistically signifcant and to have an efect on the relevant variance in issue
resolutions, by noting the author’s preconceptions for each hypothesis, and by
identifying alternative explanations for the results.
Te study ofers tentative support for expectations of systemic bias in
investment treaty arbitration in the resolution of contested jurisdictional issues,
7.

Mark A Hall & Ronald F Wright, “Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions”
(2008) 96:1 Cal L Rev 63.
8. Tere was insufcient data to test a third hypothesis of systemic bias in favour of France,
Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States as respondent states.
9. Energy Charter Treaty, 17 December 1994, 34 ILM 360 (Annex I of the Final Act of the
European Energy Charter Conference) [ECT].
10. Tis approach was informed especially by Richard Lempert, “Empirical Research for Public
Policy: With Examples from Family Law” (2008) 5 J Empirical Legal Stud 907; Les Carlson,
“Use, Misuse, and Abuse of Content Analysis for Research on the Consumer Interest” (2008)
42:1 J Consumer Afairs 100 at 102; and Gregory C Sisk & Michael Heise, “Judges and Ideology:
Public and Academic Debates About Statistical Measures” (2005) 99:2 Nw UL Rev 743 at 792.
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but it has important limitations. An initial caveat is that the fndings do not
establish evidence regarding actual bias on the part of any individual or in any
particular case.11 Even at a systemic level, there is a range of possible explanations
for the results—some of which do not at all entail inappropriate bias—and
further inferences are required to connect the observed tendencies to underlying
rationales for systemic bias. Likewise, there are limitations of the coding process
and analytical tools12 and of quantitative methods generally in the examination
of adjudicative bias.13 Te key fnding is that the observed tendencies exist in the
coded data and are very unlikely to be explained by chance. Also notable is the
fact that the observed tendencies refect variations in the resolution of legal issues
arising from ambiguous language in investment treaties. Such variations are less
likely to be explained by untested factors that can drive case outcomes, such
as factual diferences among cases or hidden meanings in the text of awards.14
Te wider question of possible bias calls for further study, and the question of
system design should depend ultimately on policy judgments about the system’s
structure and processes as informed by empirical fndings and evaluated against
doctrinal and theoretical principles of adjudication.
Tree main conclusions are drawn based on the author’s own inferences.
First, empirical research on possible bias in investment arbitration has led to
mixed, but not necessarily contradictory, fndings. Tis is not surprising because
the fndings of any individual study depend on the topic isolated for study, the
choice of methods and project design, the availability of data, the reliability of
results, inferences drawn by the researcher, and so on.15 In light of the many ways
to probe the limited data on investment treaty arbitration, the existing evidence
on systemic bias is mixed and often inconclusive.
A second conclusion is that there is not, and probably never will be, conclusive
empirical evidence of the presence or absence of systemic bias in investment
arbitration.16 In legal doctrine, this limitation of empirical methods is a reason in
11. Sisk & Heise, ibid at 794; David E Bloom, “Empirical Models of Arbitrator Behavior Under
Conventional Arbitration” (1986) 68:4 Rev Econ & Statistics 578.
12. Hall & Wright, supra note 7 at 87-88; Klaus Krippendorf, Content Analysis: An Introduction
to Its Methodology (Newbury Park: Sage, 1980) at 22.
13. CGG Aitken & F Taroni, “Fundamentals of statistical evidence – a primer for legal
professionals” (2008) 12:3 Int’l J Evidence & Proof 181 at 203.
14. Brian Leiter, “Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence” (1997) 76:2
Tex L Rev 267 at 269; Jonathan P Kastellec, “Te Statistical Analysis of Judicial Decisions
and Legal Rules with Classifcation Trees” (2010) 7:2 J Empirical Legal Stud 202 at 205-06;
and Hall & Wright, supra note 7 at 99.
15. Lempert, supra note 10.
16. Sisk & Heise, supra note 10 at 794.
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itself to require that adjudicative processes be free of reasonably perceived
bias, in addition to any demonstrated or admitted actual bias. Te point is
especially pertinent for adjudicative decisions with broad implications for
public law and public policy. Te results of the present study thus highlight
the role played by conventional safeguards of judicial independence and the
risk, in their absence, that perceived bias may arise from aspects of the
decision-making structure, including, but not limited to, arbitrator performance.
Such safeguards have the advantage of proactivity in the face of risks of actual
bias and the potential damage to the confdence of disputing parties or the
public in an adjudicative arrangement.
Te third conclusion is more tentative. Te study found evidence of systemic
bias in the case-by-case resolution by arbitrators of disputed issues of investment
treaty law. If the system is meant to provide an impartial and independent
adjudicative process based on principles of rationality, fairness, and neutrality,17
then the interpretation and application of the law should refect a degree of evenness
between claimants and respondent states in the resolution of contentious legal
issues arising from ambiguous treaty texts and should be free from signifcant
variation based on claimant nationality. However, in the resolution of the coded
issues overall, arbitrators tended to favour claimants in general and claimants
from major Western capital-exporting states in particular. Tese tendencies,
especially in combination, give tentative cause for concern and provide a basis
for further study and refection on the system’s design, not least because the use
of investment treaty arbitration appears to be a relatively recent phenomenon.

I. BACKGROUND
A. RATIONALES FOR ARBITRATOR BEHAVIOUR

Academic models of judicial behaviour identify various factors that may infuence judicial decision making, including doctrinal, attitudinal, economic,
strategic, and institutional factors.18 Te models have been extended to arbitrator
17. Costa, supra note 1 at 3. For some actors, the purpose of the system may be diferent.
For example, the purpose may be to have a system that can be infuenced or controlled
behind the scenes while appearing impartial. See Eric A Posner & John C Yoo, “Judicial
Independence in International Tribunals” (2005) 93:1 Cal L Rev 1. Because the text of many
investment treaties and general discourse on investment arbitration typically approaches the
purpose of the system in terms of adjudicative fairness, it was assumed for present purposes
that impartiality and independence are regarded generally as important.
18. Stephen J Choi & G Mitu Gulati, “Trading Votes for Reasoning: Covering in Judicial
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behaviour, often with emphasis on incentives that may infuence arbitrators.19
For example, it is theorized that arbitrators need to maintain their reputations
among prospective litigants in the relevant feld of adjudication, and thus that in
conventionally reciprocal arbitration, they will tend to reach balanced awards that
refect a compromise.20 According to the same rationale, it is also theorized that
arbitrators should not have exclusive responsibility over cases that afect third parties
or the public.21 Tat said, there are various structures of arbitration and the
diferences between them could alter arbitrator motivations in important ways.22
Te unconventional, asymmetrical structure of investment treaty arbitration
invites study based on the apparent interests of arbitrators relative to those of
conventional judges.23 Te system is unique because it uses the model of arbitration
to resolve individual claims against the state acting in its sovereign capacity.24

19.
20.

21.
22.
23.

24.

Opinions” (2008) 81:4 S Cal L Rev 735 at 736-37; Emerson H Tiller & Frank B Cross,
“What is Legal Doctrine?” (2006) 100:1 Nw UL Rev 517; Joshua B Fischman & David
S Law, “What is Judicial Ideology, and How Should We Measure It?” (2009) 29:1 Wash
UJL & Pol’y 133; Richard A Posner, “Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic
Approach” (2005) 32:3 Fla S UL Rev 1259 [Posner, “Judicial Behaviour”]; Richard A Posner,
“What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (Te Same Ting Everybody Else Does)” (1993) 3
Sup Ct Econ Rev 1; Tracey E George, “Developing a Positive Teory of Decisionmaking on
U.S. Courts of Appeals” (1998) 58:5 Ohio St LJ 1635 at 1655-56; and Erik Voeten, “Te
Impartiality of International Judges: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights”
(2008) 102:4 Am Pol Sci Rev 417.
Colvin, supra note 6 at 12; Robert D Cooter, “Te Objectives of Private and Public Judges”
(1983) 41:1 Pub Choice 107.
Posner, “Judicial Behaviour,” supra note 18 at 1260-61; Drahozal, “Judicial Incentives,”
supra note 6 at 471; Alan Scott Rau, “Integrity in Private Judging” (1997) 38 S Tex L Rev
485 at 523; G Richard Shell, “Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Efects of Commercial
Arbitration” (1988) 35 UCLA L Rev 623 at 633-34; and Daphna Kapeliuk, “Te Repeat
Appointment Factor: Exploring Decision Patterns of Elite Investment Arbitrators” (2010)
96:1 Cornell L Rev 47 at 61-63.
Cooter, supra note 19 at 131.
Bloom, supra note 11 at 578.
William M Landes & Richard A Posner, “Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study”
(2009) 1:1 J Legal Analysis 775 at 779-80; Frederick Schauer, “Incentives, Reputation, and
the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior” (2000) 68:3 U Cin L Rev 615 at 620-21;
and Drahozal, “Judicial Incentives,” supra note 6 at 472-73.
Some forms of domestic arbitration create a de facto asymmetry in which arbitrator
interests may appear tied to interests of a dominant class of parties in the claims structure.
For example, in employment or consumer arbitration in the United States, employers or
producers—as a class of parties—are sometimes repeat players, deep-pocketed, directly
in control of the arbitration institution, or in control of the terms of the agreements to
arbitrate. See Colvin, supra note 6 at 11; Mara Kent, “‘Forced’ vs. Compulsory Arbitration of
Civil Rights Claims” (2005) 23:1 Law & Ineq 95 at 95-96; and Katherine Palm, “Arbitration
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Under domestic legal systems, this type of claim—whether under constitutional
law or administrative law—is ultimately subject to resolution in the courts, not
by arbitrators. Under customary international law, such claims might culminate
in a claim of diplomatic protection by one state against another, in which case
any use of arbitration to resolve the dispute would be based on a conventional
framework of reciprocal state-to-state arbitration. Te same reciprocal framework
applies generally in the arbitration of commercial disputes, including commercial
disputes between investors and states, the latter acting in a private capacity.
Finally, where individuals are permitted to sue states directly under international
law, such as in the European regional courts, such disputes are resolved using a
judicial model.25
Unlike conventional arbitration,26 then, investment treaty arbitration is
non-reciprocal in that investors can sue states under an investment treaty but
cannot themselves be sued by states (other than in limited circumstances of a
counterclaim arising from the original claim by the investor). In this respect, the
system’s structure is more akin to that of judicial review in domestic public law.27
Importantly, the system removes the customary duty of private parties to exhaust
domestic remedies before proceeding to an international claim against a state. On
this basis, the system resembles domestic judicial review to a greater extent than
do other forms of international adjudication that generally require exhaustion
of domestic remedies. However, unlike domestic or international courts that
otherwise resolve these types of claims, investment treaty arbitration does not
incorporate certain institutional safeguards of judicial independence such as
secure judicial tenure, objective methods of appointment of judges to specifc
cases, and restrictions on outside remuneration by the judge.28

25.

26.
27.
28.

Clauses in Nursing Home Admission Agreements: Framing the Debate” (2006) 14:2 Elder
LJ 453 at 478. Unlike investment treaty arbitration, these forms of arbitration are usually
de facto but not de jure asymmetrical and are generally not used to decide regulatory claims
against the state without the prospect of court review (but see Catherine A Rogers, “Te
Arrival of the ‘Have-Nots’ in International Arbitration” (2007) 8:1 Nev LJ 341 at 350-51
[Rogers, “Te Arrival”]; Ann E Krasuski, “Mandatory Arbitration Agreements Do Not
Belong in Nursing Home Contracts With Residents” (2004) 8:1 DePaul J Health Care L
263 at 268-69).
Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2007) ch 3; Gus Van Harten, “Te Public-Private Distinction in the International
Arbitration of Individual Claims Against the State” (2007) 56:2 ICLQ 371.
Bloom, supra note 11 at 580.
Abram Chayes, “Te Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation” (1976) 89:7 Harv L Rev 1281.
See Frank B Cross & Dain C Donelson, “Creating Quality Courts” (2010) 7:3 J Empirical
Legal Stud 490 at 498; Catherine A Rogers, “Regulating International Arbitrators: A
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Te broad question of this study is how this unique structure might afect
arbitrator behaviour. Te study examines this question by attempting to falsify
claims and expectations that the system will favour investors over respondent
governments and Western capital-exporting states over developing or transition
states.29 Te study does so in a focused way by using systematic content analysis
to code arbitrators’ resolutions of issues of jurisdiction and admissibility in
individual cases. Te method is discussed later, in Part II of the article. In the
remainder of this section, further information is provided on the rationales for
possible systemic bias and on other relevant studies.
B. RATIONALES FOR SYSTEMIC BIAS

Te theoretical rationale for systemic bias in investment treaty arbitration, as
tested here, derives from assumptions about arbitrator incentives based on the
system’s structure.30 Te asymmetrical claims structure and absence of institutional markers of judicial independence create apparent incentives for arbitrators
to favour the class of parties (here, investors) that is able to invoke the use of the
system.31 Also, arbitrators may be infuenced by a need to appease actors who
have power or infuence over specifc appointment decisions or over the wider
position of the relevant arbitration industry.32 Participants in the system have
rejected such expectations,33 and it is not suggested here that they are the only
possible factors that can infuence arbitrator behaviour. Yet these expectations
refect the “question of the incentives that so often operate on arbitrators—that
is, of their self-interest in trying to secure and expand prospects for future arbitral
appointments” (“a dynamic that is well-understood, if rarely discussed with any
frankness”) and the related expectations that “[a]n arbitrator may perceive that

29.

30.
31.
32.
33.

Functional Approach to Developing Standards of Conduct” (2005) 41:1 Stan J Int’l L 53
at 56-57.
Bernasconi-Osterwalder, supra note 3 at 69; Roberto Dañino, “Opening Remarks” (Making
the Most of International Investment Agreements: A Common Agenda, Symposium coorganized by ICSID, the OECD and UNCTAD, delivered at OECD Headquarters, Paris,
12 December 2005), [unpublished]; Chung, supra note 3 at 963-66; and Odumosu, supra
note 3 at 346-48, 364, 371-72.
See especially Yves Dezalay & Bryant G Garth, Dealing in Virtue (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1996) at 8-9, 36, 45, 50, 70, 93, 124, 194.
Drahozal, “Judicial Incentives,” supra note 6 at 500, 503; Nudrat Majeed, “Investor-State
Disputes and International Law: From the Far Side” (2004) 98 Am Soc’y Int’l L Proc 30 at 31.
Walter Mattli, “Private Justice in a Global Economy: From Litigation to Arbitration” (2001)
55:4 Int’l Organization 919 at 921-22; Rogers, “Vocation,” supra note 1 at 968.
See e.g. William W Park, “Arbitrator Integrity: Te Transient and the Permanent” (2009)
46:3 San Diego L Rev 629 at 651-53, 657-66.
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his award is likely to have an impact on his own acceptability, that is, on the
probability of his being appointed again … [o]r [that] an award may afect the
marketability of the appointing organization, on which the arbitrator depends
for future referrals.”34
Assuming that investment arbitrators will in general aspire to (re)appointment
and to the promotion of the wider industry, they appear to be dependent to
varying degrees on:
1. Tose who are able to initiate claims in an asymmetrical claims
structure;
2. Tose who exercise power in the arbitration centres that operate as
appointing authorities under investment treaties;35
3. Tose who have the power to include investment arbitration clauses
in legal instruments such as investment treaties and investment
contracts; and
4. Tose who act as ‘gatekeepers’ or otherwise wield infuence in the
arbitration industry.
Each of these groups of actors has potential infuence over the career or fnancial
success of arbitrators and over the wider position of the arbitration industry by
their ability to trigger use of the system, to appoint or ‘green-light’ individual
arbitrators, to decide confict of interest claims, to employ arbitrators in a wider
professional context, to maintain the general use of investment arbitration, or
otherwise to shape market demand for the services of investment arbitrators and
the arbitration industry. Tis broad outline provides rationales for potential
hypotheses about the behaviour of investment arbitrators, including the hypotheses
tested in the present study. Tat said, this study does not purport to test all
aspects of these rationales.
Te study focusses on two sets of actors: prospective claimants and major
capital-exporting states. Te assumed infuence of prospective claimants stems
from their power to initiate use of the system and from the wider role of foreign
investors (especially major frms) in employing arbitrators, in making decisions at
34. Rau, supra note 20 at 521-22.
35. Te designated appointing authorities have powers to appoint arbitrators and to resolve
confict of interest claims against arbitrators, for example, that are often assigned to executive
ofcials within the relevant organization. Te main arbitration organizations in investment
treaty arbitration are the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) in Washington, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague, the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris, the London Court of International Arbitration, and
the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.
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private arbitration centres such as the International Chamber of Commerce,
and in concluding investment contracts containing arbitration clauses. Te
assumed infuence of major states stems from their role in authorizing arbitration
in investment treaties and their relative power in state-based arbitration centres
such as the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
and the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
Tus, the study focusses on possible infuences on arbitrator decision making
based primarily on an economic model of adjudicative behaviour. Tat said,
the study does not aim to show that any particular set of factors is the sole or
dominant determinant of decision making or to isolate one or another rationale
among those underlying the hypotheses. Te purpose is simply to test and
attempt to falsify expectations that certain factors will play an observable role at
a systemic level. Importantly, one should not mistake an evaluation of the institutional structure and performance of an adjudicative system for a comprehensive
theory of adjudicator behaviour in that system. A range of factors and complex
interactions of factors will undoubtedly be present in the thought processes of
any adjudicator and in the deliberations of any tribunal. Indeed, it is partly for
this reason, and the corresponding difculty of pinpointing any actual bias and
its cause, that legal doctrine requires the absence of reasonably perceived bias as
well as actual bias in judicial decision making.36
C. RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER STUDIES

In this section, the present study is situated in the context of previous work. More
detail is provided in Appendix One.
Tere are several studies relating to the present research question.37 Most
of these have focused on quantitative analysis of win-loss or other remedial
outcomes in a sample of cases, rather than on other aspects of decision making

36. See e.g. Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfeld Properties Ltd, [1999] EWCA Civ 3004, [2000] 1 QB
451; R v Valente, [1985] 2 SCR 673.
37. Dezalay & Garth, supra note 30; Ole Kristian Fauchald, “Te Legal Reasoning of ICSID
Tribunals – An Empirical Analysis” (2008) 19:2 EJIL 301; Kathleen S McArthur & Pablo
A Ormachea, “International Investor-State Arbitration: An Empirical Analysis of ICSID
Decisions on Jurisdiction” (2009) 28:3 Rev Litig 559; Susan D Franck, “Development
and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration” (2009) 50:2 Harv Int’l LJ 435 [Franck,
“Development and Outcomes”]; Susan D Franck, “Te ICSID Efect? Considering
Potential Variations in ICSID Awards” (2010) 51:4 Va J Int’l L 825 [Franck, “Te ICSID
Efect”]; Kapeliuk, supra note 20; Kevin P Gallagher & Elen Shrestha “Investment Treaty
Arbitration and Development: A Re-Appraisal” (2011) 11-01 GDAE Working Paper; and
Costa, supra note 1.
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such as legal reasoning. Tey have produced useful and interesting information,
usually in descriptive terms, but also have important limitations. In general, they
have produced mixed or inconclusive information on possible bias in investment
arbitration. First, from a qualitative point of view, the seminal study by Yves
Dezalay and Bryant Garth is dated and may not capture experiences in investment
arbitration since the recent explosion of investment treaty claims.38 Second,
although there are important variations among them, the general approach of the
relevant quantitative studies has been to collect and analyze information on case
outcomes.39 On the issue of possible bias in investment arbitration, these studies
should be approached with caution because all were based on limited data,
and those that tested for signifcance identifed a high risk that the results
were explained by chance. In some cases, the studies included statements that
went well beyond the study’s results.40
Tese limitations of the existing research are due partly to the signifcant
lack of available data on international investment arbitration. However, they may
also arise from the focus on case outcomes. Tis focus refects a valid approach to
empirical study but it has important limitations.41 Data on outcomes as a measure
38. Supra note 30; but see Rogers, “Vocation,” supra note 1 at 965-68.
39. See McArthur & Ormachea, supra note 37; Franck, “Development and Outcomes,” supra
note 37; Franck, “Te ICSID Efect,” supra note 37; Kapeliuk, supra note 20; and Gallagher
& Shrestha, supra note 37.
40. McArthur & Ormachea, ibid. Te authors state that the results indicate “that investors are
always better of relying on a BIT to establish jurisdiction” (at 582) and that “claims are
most likely to fail against those very same countries where an investor had the best reasons to
demand international arbitration protection” (at 583). See also Franck, “Development and
Outcomes,” supra note 37. Te study’s abstract notes that:
Te results demonstrate that, at the macro level, development status does not have a statistically signifcant relationship with outcome. Tis suggests that the investment treaty arbitration
system, as a whole, functions fairly and that the eradication or radical overhaul of the arbitration process is unnecessary (at 435).

Further, the study concludes with a statement that:
Te notion that outcome is not associated with arbitrator or respondent development status
… provides evidence about the integrity of arbitration and casts doubt on the assumption
that arbitrators from developed states show a bias in terms of arbitration outcomes or that the
development status of respondent states afect[s] such outcomes (at 487).

See also Kapeliuk, supra note 20. Te study’s abstract notes that “[t]he research shows that
repeat arbitrators display no biases and no tendencies to ‘split the diference’” (at 47), and
in the conclusion the author states that the results “clearly defy any claim that investmentarbitration tribunals tend to rule in favour of investors” (at 90).
41. Hall & Wright, supra note 7 at 85-87; R Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, “Is the Federal
Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance” (2004) 152:3 U Pa L
Rev 1105 at 1127-28.
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of actual behaviour are open to a wide range of possible explanations42 such as
variations in the strength of parties’ claims, diversity of fact situations, possible
infation of amounts claimed, procedural and structural variations among
arbitration forums, or varying levels of political infuence by states and private
actors. It is difcult, if not impossible, to identify the ‘appropriate’ spread of
outcomes against which actual outcomes should be measured.43 Related to this
is the problem that data on outcomes at one or another stage of a case may not
capture aspects of tribunal decisions—such as legal interpretations or procedural
decisions—that might refect bias, regardless of the fnal outcome. Cumulative
data on outcomes also do not explain whether some aspect or step in the
decision-making process was infuenced inappropriately, leaving a prospect for
actual or perceived bias in any specifc case regardless of the fnal outcome.
An aim of the present study was to attempt to address some of these limitations
using the method of content analysis.44 Tis method is “a systematic, replicable
technique for compressing many words of text into fewer content categories
based on explicit rules of coding” that can be used to supplement other forms
of inquiry.45 Relative to outcome-based analysis, the method appeared attractive
because it ofered a more value-added role for legal expertise in quantitative study
and enabled a more systematic approach to collecting information on investment
law doctrine. Te study is not intended to promote content analysis over other
methods but simply to observe the system diferently, to provide a means to
triangulate data and methods, to encourage further inquiry, and to sharpen issues
for discussion.

II. METHODS
A. AIMS AND HYPOTHESES

Te project was designed to collect and analyze information on contested
issues in investment treaty law and, specifcally, to test hypotheses arising from
42. Gregory C Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P Morriss, “Charting the Infuences on the
Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning” (1998) 73:5 NYUL Rev 1377 at
1380-82.
43. Lisa B Bingham, “On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in
Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards” (1998) 29:2 McGeorge L Rev 223 at
246.
44. Hall & Wright, supra note 7 at 66.
45. Steve Stemler, “An Overview of Content Analysis,” (2001) 7 Practical Assessment,
Research & Evaluation 17 at para 1, online: <http://pareonline.net/getvn.asp?v=7&n=17>;
Krippendorf, supra note 12 at 23.
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the system’s structure and from the absence of institutional markers of judicial
independence. Tree a priori hypotheses were identifed.46
Hypothesis 1: Arbitrators will adopt expansive approaches to issues of legal interpretation more frequently than restrictive approaches.

Hypothesis 1 was based on the expectation that arbitrators would tend to
favour expansive approaches to contested issues of jurisdiction or admissibility.
Te expectation was based on apparent incentives of arbitrators to encourage
claims by signalling to prospective claimants that a potential claim is likely
to proceed.47 Te characterization of expansive and restrictive approaches is
discussed below. Notably, the coded issues were limited to questions of jurisdiction
and admissibility and did not include, for example, substantive standards or
procedural issues.
Based on previous non-systematic study of investment law, the author’s own
tentative preconception was that arbitrators would, in general, favour expansive
approaches to contested issues of jurisdiction and admissibility. Te degree
to which arbitrators might do so, the degree to which any specifc coded issue
would arise in cases, and the degree to which the tendencies for any particular
issue would be expansive or restrictive, were all unknown. Tere was also a strong
expectation, based on past studies, that there would be insufcient data to support
statistically signifcant fndings.
Hypothesis 2: Te anticipated tendency toward expansive approaches will be accentuated in cases brought by claimants from France, Germany, the United Kingdom,
and the United States.
Hypothesis 3: Te anticipated tendency toward expansive approaches will be reduced
in cases brought against France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United
States.

Tese hypotheses were based on expectations that arbitrators would be
more responsive to the interests of major Western capital-exporting states than
those of other states due to the relative infuence of the former. Te hypotheses
identifed four states as an approximate measure of major Western capital-exporters.
46. Other potential hypotheses were identifed in the initial planning of the project based on the
theoretical expectations but were not tested in this study. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, “Te
Rules of Inference” (2002) 69 U Chicago L Rev 1 at 61, 65, 70. For example, other potential
hypotheses arose from expectations that arbitrators would tend to favour corporate claimants,
especially large companies, over other natural persons. Te hypotheses may be the subject of
future research.
47. See Bernard Trujillo, “Regulating Bankruptcy Abuse: An Empirical Study of Consumer
Exemptions Cases” (2006) 3:3 J Empirical Legal Stud 561 at 576.
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Tese states were isolated based on literature and discourse on the system and
on country-by-country data on total foreign direct investment outward stock.48
Although Hypotheses 2 and 3 were designed to test expectations of possible bias,
the author had no preconceptions about the extent to which either hypothesis
would be confrmed, with one exception: an expectation, based on non-systematic
study of past cases, that arbitrators would favour a restrictive approach in cases
against the United States under the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA)49 and that there would be little, if any, data for France, Germany, and
the United Kingdom as respondents. Tere was a strong expectation that there
would be insufcient data to generate statistically signifcant evidence for either
hypothesis. In light of this, the fact and extent of the accentuated tendency in the
results for Hypothesis 2 was surprising.
B. IDENTIFICATION OF ISSUES AND ISSUE RESOLUTIONS

Awards were coded for the occurrence and resolution of seven issues of investment
treaty law. All issues related to topics of jurisdiction or admissibility, although in
some cases they engaged aspects of other types of issues.50 Te issues, and the
expansive and restrictive approaches to each, were identifed in advance.51 Where
an issue was found to have arisen in a case, each arbitrator’s resolution of the issue

48. According to data from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
World Investment Reports published between 2004-2010, France, Germany, the United
Kingdom, and the United States were the top states in total foreign direct investment
(FDI) outward stock for the fve years preceding the design of the study (2003-2007) and
in subsequent years (2008-09); the United States was consistently ranked frst and France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom alternated between the remaining positions, usually with
the United Kingdom ranked second. See UNCTAD World Investment Report (New York:
United Nations, 2004-2010), Annex Table 04 on FDI outward stock, online: <http://www.
unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=5545&lang=1>.
49. North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Canada, the Government of
Mexico and the Government of the United States, 17 December 1992, Can TS 1994 No 2, 32
ILM 289 (entered into force 1 January 1994) [NAFTA].
50. Te focus on issues of jurisdiction and admissibility had no special signifcance and was
arrived at to provide a basis on which to develop the classifcation system and make the
coding process manageable, leaving options for further content analysis focusing on
resolutions of substantive or procedural issues in investment treaty law.
51. Te aim was not to examine ideological preferences of arbitrators and the study is agnostic
on the question of the appropriate approach to the resolution of any issue. Te language of
“pro-investor” or “pro-state” was avoided on the basis that it is not necessarily the case that an
expansive approach, as coded, is pro-investor and so on. In considering whether an expansive
approach is pro-investor, for example, should one evaluate the interests of the specifc
claimant, future claimants, or investors as a whole?
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was classifed as expansive, restrictive, or non-classifable.52 Te expansive and
restrictive approaches to each issue refected positions that tended to enhance or
reduce, respectively, the compensatory promise of the system for claimants and
the risk of liability for states. Non-classifable situations included resolutions that,
as explained in the award, did not fall reasonably within the scope of an expansive
or restrictive category in the template.53
An issues template was developed in advance to identify expansive and
restrictive resolutions for each coded issue. Coding was intended to cover a
reasonable sample of contested approaches to issues of jurisdiction or admissibility. Tese approaches were developed based on a review of existing awards
and secondary literature and on consultations with outside legal experts.54 Te
process was meant to limit and guide the author’s discretion in identifying issues
and delineating resolutions, but a degree of discretion undoubtedly remained.55
Te issues identifed for coding related to the following general topics: corporate
person investor, natural person investor, investment, minority shareholder interest,
permissibility of investment, parallel claims, and scope of most-favoured-nation
treatment. Coding was not intended to encompass all of the possible legal interpretations of these topics or of the coded issues. Rather, for each issue, descriptions
of an expansive or restrictive approach were identifed and resolutions were then
coded based on whether the tribunal’s approach fell reasonably within any of
the descriptions. In all cases, the expansive and restrictive approaches refected
situations in which an issue was subject to a measure of ambiguity in the
relevant treaty.56 Where the treaty was clear and express on how the issue should
52. An arbitrator was deemed to have resolved an issue where the arbitrator put his or her name
to the reasons for an award or decision that explained the relevant resolution. An arbitrator
who gave separate reasons for a decision was coded diferently than other members of the
tribunal where his or her reasons resolved the issue diferently from other members.
53. Non-classifable situations also included those in which the issue was resolved specifcally and
expressly by the terms of the relevant treaty, the claim or argument was withdrawn by a party,
or the tribunal found it unnecessary to resolve the issue.
54. Hall & Wright, supra note 7 at 107; Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 41 at 1131-36.
55. For example, the template was developed in the spring of 2009, and it was recognized
that, over time, divergences in the law may evolve and particular issues or approaches may
fade in importance. On this, a degree of fexibility was maintained for coding resolutions
that appeared to have evolved from an approach described in the template, but in a way
that was consistent with the underlying rationale for the classifcation. Tis fexibility was
exercised very rarely (specifcally, in a few cases where the resolution built on the restrictive
approach to the concept of investment by extending the Fedax criteria beyond the ICSID
Convention). Te general guideline was to maintain the a priori characterization of an issue
strictly but not slavishly.
56. See Carolyn Shapiro, “Te Context of Ideology: Law, Politics, and Empirical Legal
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be resolved, the resolution of the issue was not considered a sufcient exercise of
arbitrator discretion and was not coded as expansive or restrictive.
Te template is reproduced in Appendix 2 with footnotes to indicate the
sources that were used to model expansive and restrictive approaches. Te following
provides a brief summary of the topics and issues:
1. Corporate person investor: Should a claim be permissible where
ownership of the investment extends through a chain of companies
running from the host to the home state via a third state? Expansive
approach: yes. Restrictive approach: no.
2. Natural person investor: Should a claim be permissible where
brought by a natural person (a) against the only state of which the
person is a citizen or (b) against a state of which the person is a citizen
without confirmation of dominant and effective nationality?
Expansive answer: yes to either of the two questions. Restrictive
approach: no to either of the two questions.
3. Investment: Should the Fedax57 criteria be applied to limit the
concept of investment under the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States
(ICSID Convention);58 or, regardless of whether under the ICSID
Convention, should there be a requirement for an actual transfer of
capital into the host state as a feature of an investment; or should
the concept of investment be limited to traditional categories of
ownership? Expansive approach: no to any of the three questions.
Restrictive approach: yes to any of the three questions.
4. Minority shareholder interests: Should a claim by a minority
shareholder be allowed where the treaty does not permit claims
by minority shareholders, such as where the treaty does not include
the term “shares” in the defnition of investment, or should it be
permitted without limiting the claim to the shareholder’s interest
in the value and disposition of the shares (as opposed to interests
of the domestic frm itself )? Expansive approach: yes to either
Scholarship” (2010) 75:1 Mo L Rev 79 at 85.
57. Fedax NV v Republic of Venezuela (1997), 37 ILM 1378 (International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes) [Fedax].
58. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States, 18 March 1965, ICSID/15, 4 ILM 524 (entered into force 14 October 1966)
[ICSID Convention].
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of the two questions. Restrictive approach: no to either of the
two questions.
5. Permissibility of investment: Should there be an evident onus
placed on the claimant (or the respondent state) to show that an
investment was (or was not) afrmatively approved or was (or was
not) based on corrupt practices? Expansive approach: onus on the
respondent state. Restrictive approach: onus on the claimant.
6. Parallel claims: Should a claim be allowed in the face of a treatybased duty to resort to local remedies that clearly was not satisfed by
the claimant; in the face of a contractually agreed dispute settlement
clause relating to the same factual dispute; in the face of an actual
claim, arising from the same factual dispute, via the relevant path of
a treaty-based fork-in-the-road clause;59 or in the face of an actual
claim, arising from the same factual dispute, via another treaty that
could lead to a damages award in favour of the investor. Expansive
approach: yes to any of the four questions. Restrictive approach: no
to any of the four questions.
7. Scope of most-favoured-nation treatment: Should the concept of
most-favoured-nation treatment be extended to non-substantive
provisions of other treaties (such as dispute settlement provisions)?
Expansive approach: yes. Restrictive approach: no.
Te aim of this exercise was to capture a reasonable sample of contested
legal issues of jurisdiction and admissibility, focusing on issues of general
signifcance on the basis that such issues should ideally be applied consistently
across cases and that such issues are more likely to have symbolic meaning for
investors and for states.60 Issues that were specifc to a single treaty or case, and
factual determinations, were not coded.61
59. A fork-in-the-road clause requires an investor to choose between pursuing one of two (or
more) paths, such as domestic courts and investment treaty arbitration, that are available to
adjudicate the dispute with the host state.
60. Trujillo, supra note 47 at 576; Krippendorf, supra note 12 at 22.
61. Te line between law and outcome was not always clear. In some cases, aspects of the
resolution of an issue were connected to outcome, especially at the jurisdictional stage. Tat
said, resolutions were not coded according to whether the issue determined the jurisdictional
outcome of the case. Likewise, distinctions between the ratio decidendi and obiter dicta of a
case were avoided on the basis that they can be difcult to maintain and that a resolution,
even if obiter, can nevertheless have symbolic meaning for claimants and respondents. But see
Fauchald, supra note 37 at 315.

VAN HARTEN, ARBITRATOR BEHAVIOUR 229

C. DATA SOURCES AND CODING PROCESS

Te primary data source was the text of awards in known62 investment treaty
cases decided by 10 May 2010 and publicly available63 by 1 June 2010. In the
case of a few descriptive felds, data were obtained from sources other than the
text of awards.64 Tere were two stages of coding. Te frst stage proceeded as
follows. A codebook was developed and reviewed periodically.65 Beginning in the
summer of 2008, descriptive information on known cases was collected by three
research assistants (all J.D. students) working in sequence over a three-year period.
Te second and third researchers collected information with knowledge of earlier
coding. Tus, the descriptive data were double- and in some cases triple-coded, but
not blindly.66 At this stage of the coding, discretion was relatively limited.67 Te
key concern was to ensure that coders were well trained in the codebook—they
were given about two weeks to study the codebook and practice its application
on sample cases—and confdent of their autonomy.
A more elaborate process was used at the second stage of the coding.
Following the development of the template, a sample of awards was coded

62. A case was “known”: (1) where it was listed on the Investment Treaty Arbitration (www.
italaw.com, maintained by Andrew Newcombe of the University of Victoria) with an
indication that it was brought under an investment treaty, or (2) where it was listed as a
treaty-based case on any of the websites of ICSID, the Permanent Court of Arbitration
website, the Energy Charter Treaty Secretariat, or the governments of Canada, Mexico, or the
United States.
63. An award was “publicly available” if it was posted on the Investment Treaty Arbitration
website, ibid.
64. For example, supplementary information on arbitrator nationalities was collected via a
Google search as a supplement to awards. In NAFTA Chapter 11 cases, information on dates
of claims was obtained from materials fled by the parties rather than simply from awards.
65. Te codebook included numerous felds of basic information. Te following information
was relevant to the present study: name of case, name and nationality of claimant, name
of respondent state, date of claim, dates of known awards, and identity and nationality of
arbitrators associated with each award in the case. Further information on the codebook is
available from the author.
66. About 15% of the descriptive data was checked by the author. Where errors or discrepancies
were identifed, the coded information was referred back to the coder. In rare cases, the
author re-coded data (for the present study, the only data that was re-coded was for dates of
claims). Inter-coder reliability was not tracked formally at this stage of the project, although
periodic data checks by coders or the author indicated that inconsistencies were rare.
67. One example of a discretionary coding issue related to the date of the claim in a case. Under
some investment treaties, a notice of claim is fled by an investor prior to the fling of the
actual claim. Te earlier of the two dates was used to mark the date of the claim.
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for discussion. All awards were then reviewed in groups according to treaty
type or respondent state. Coding required reading all awards in known cases in
order to determine whether an issue had arisen and, if so, whether its resolution
ft an expansive or restrictive approach. Coding began in the summer of 2009 and
was carried out by three coders. Te frst was a J.D. student and research assistant
who coded all of the awards, with periodic discussion of general issues arising
from the template. Te second was the author who coded all issue resolutions,
with access to coding decisions of the frst coder. Discrepancies in the coding
were then reviewed by the frst coder.68 In cases where the coders disagreed, the
matter was referred to a third coder (a research assistant and lawyer) who made a
fnal decision as between the anonymized positions of the frst and second coders.
Coding at this stage was based on the text of publicly available awards.69
Tus, any issues or resolutions not outlined expressly in the award could not be
captured by the coding process. Tis refects a general limitation of content analysis.70
Also, awards were coded where they engaged any issue in the template, regardless of
the stage of the proceedings at which the issue arose or the way in which it was
characterized by the parties or the tribunal. Te question for coders was whether
an issue arose and how it was resolved based on the template; it was not how
the issue was framed by the parties or the tribunal, although this may clearly
afect whether an issue could be found to have arisen. Where an award was not
available in English,71 the case was not coded so as to maintain consistency across
the coders, who shared only English as a common language. Where there was
no reference to any jurisdictional or admissibility issues in any publicly available
award, the case was coded as not public for all issues.72 Tus, in some cases, issues

68. In a small number of cases, the coders’ roles were reversed in that the second coder was
the frst to review a case, identify issues, and refer resolutions for coding by the frst coder,
subject to a review by the second coder of any diferences in coding and fnal submission to a
tiebreaker.
69. To maintain consistency across cases and treaties, information in publicly available awards
was not supplemented by other potential sources of information, such as materials fled by
the parties (typically available under NAFTA Chapter 11 but not other treaties) or secondary
reports.
70. Hall & Wright, supra note 7 at 100.
71. Awards were coded where available originally in English, where available in English via an
ofcial translation, or where available in English via an unofcial translation that was posted
on the Investment Treaty Arbitration website (supra note 62).
72. See e.g. Joseph Charles Lemire v Ukraine (2000), 15 ICSID Rev 530, 6 ICSID Rep 60
(International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes). Te only publicly available
decision was a record of settlement by the parties that followed a non-public award on
jurisdiction. Te case was coded as not public.
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that arose in a case may not have been coded because they were dealt with in an
award that was not among the publicly available materials for the case. Tis was a
consequence of varying levels of openness across cases and treaties.73
D. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Tis section highlights methodological limitations. Te frst relates to the dataset,
which included the full universe of publicly available English-language awards in
known investment treaty cases that had dealt with jurisdictional or admissibility
matters up to the cut-of dates. Tis represented a sample of total investment
treaty cases up to the cut-ofs because some known cases did not have publicly
available awards and because there is an indeterminate number of other cases, the
existence of which is unknown.74 If the body of coded awards is diferent from
that of non-public or unknown awards, then the study’s results will be subject to
case-selection bias.75 In response to this possibility, the project focused on legal
issues arising from decisions at or after the jurisdictional stage, on the assumption
that a case is less likely to remain confdential where it has reached that stage. On
the other hand, this approach would not address situations where a known case has
not led to a publicly available award.76 Even so, the analysis of publicly available
awards in known cases remains a reasonable basis of study so long as conclusions
refect appropriate inferences and are limited to the studied universe.77
Second, it was recognized that coder discretion was integral to the project
and steps were taken to limit this discretion.78 Tese included the development
73. Tat said, it was very rare to see cases that had a published award but that did have an award
addressing jurisdictional matters to some degree.
74. For example, besides anecdotal reports of non-public cases, the International Chamber of
Commerce reported during 2005-2009 an average of 69 arbitrations per year that involved
a state or state entity. See International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) International Court
of Arbitration, “Facts and Figures on ICC Arbitration – Statistical Reports,” online: <http://
www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration/id5531/index.html>. No specifc information on these
cases is public, however, and it is unclear how many were pursuant to treaties as opposed to
investment contracts or domestic legislation.
75. Christopher R Drahozal, “Arbitration by the Numbers: Te State of Empirical Research on
International Commercial Arbitration” (2006) 22:2 Arb Int’l 291 at 294. For example, in
order for awards in known cases to be public, the cases must not have been settled before
the stage of a frst award by a tribunal, and the character of investor-state conficts in known
cases may difer from that of conficts in cases that have settled at an earlier stage.
76. In the dataset, there were 174 known cases that had led to an award on jurisdictional matters.
In 22 of these cases (13%) the relevant award was not public.
77. Hall & Wright, supra note 7 at 105; Krippendorf, supra note 12 at 25-28.
78. Hall & Wright, ibid at 109; Michael Evans et al, “Recounting the Courts? Applying
Automated Content Analysis to Enhance Empirical Legal Research” (2007) 4 J Empirical
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of the coding template, the use of external sources to identify approaches to issue
resolutions, communication with experts to review the template, and the use of
a double-coding process supplemented by a tiebreaker. At the content analysis
stage, the coding decisions of the frst and second coders were evaluated for intercoder reliability79 as indicated in Table 1.
TABLE 1: INTER-CODER RELIABILITY
Actual inter-coder
reliability (%)

Random chance of intercoder reliability (%)

Coding of whether or not an issue arose (for coding
as either expansive or restrictive).

74.7

50

Coding of whether the resolution of an issue was
either expansive or restrictive.

98.7

50

Coding aspect

Despite these steps, discretionary choices were integral at various stages of the
project.80 For purposes of transparency and replication, the template is appended
and case-by-case coded data are publicly available. Other researchers are invited
to review the coding decisions on each issue and in each case in order to inform
their own conclusions about the coding process and the study.
Tird, the study examined tendencies in interpretative approaches based on
the quantifcation of complex processes of adjudicative decision making. Te
focus on issue resolutions mitigated some of the limitations of outcome-based
research. However, legal content analysis also has important limitations. For
one, the examination of jurisdictional issues may mean that the results are
unrepresentative of other aspects of investment treaty law. More broadly, content
analysis involves a compromise between, on the one hand, the benefts of
systematized review and analysis and, on the other hand, the costs of reducing

Legal Stud 1007 at 1008-09.
79. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 41 at 1140.
80. For example, separate opinions, whether dissenting or concurring, presented coding
issues that were resolved as follows. Where the separate opinion dealt with a coded issue
explicitly, then it was coded separately from the main reasons of the tribunal. In such
circumstances, where the separate opinion identifed an issue that was dealt with in the
main reasons of the tribunal but the author of the separate opinion did not declare a
position on the issue, then the issue resolution for the relevant arbitrator was coded as
non-classifable. However, where the separate opinion did not explicitly raise an issue that
was dealt with in the main reasons of the tribunal, then the relevant arbitrator was assumed
to share the view of the tribunal as a whole. In the great majority of cases with separate
opinions, it was not difcult either to distinguish the separate opinion from the tribunal’s
main reasons or to identify it with those reasons.
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complex qualitative phenomena to quantitative indicators.81 Te study thus
provides approximate correlations not frm conclusions.82
Fourth, it is important to emphasize that the study was not intended to
identify actual bias in any specifc case but rather to test expectations at a systemic
level.83 Tus, the study sought to mark out a manoeuvring space that is available
for the interpretation of contested legal issues and to locate diferent decisions
within that space. As the law evolves, so too may the defnitions of what qualifes
as expansive or restrictive. Tis is particularly important because investment treaty
arbitration is not a hierarchical system of adjudication, meaning that there may
be greater fuidity and less predictability in the law.84
Te study’s fndings should therefore be approached with caution. Richard
Lempert counsels that “[s]ound research … can help policymakers and administrators devise more efective laws and procedures, but empirical studies are almost
never a magic bullet.”85 While the study found statistically signifcant evidence
to support two hypotheses, it is only one study based on a particular method
for analysis of focused aspects of a small dataset. Other factors beyond the
limited evidence available from existing studies should therefore play an important
role in policy discussions about the system. Importantly, the mixed and often
inconclusive evidence in existing studies appears to support doctrinal rationales for
institutional markers of judicial independence that protect against both reasonably
perceived bias and risks of actual bias in adjudication.

III. THE DATASET AND ANALYTICAL MODELS
A. DATASET

Te study involved a review of the awards (i.e., decisions) in all known investment treaty cases decided as of 10 May 2010 and publicly available in English as
of 1 June 2010. A total of 261 cases were identifed, of which 174 were found to
have led to an award on jurisdictional matters. Of these 174 cases, 22 were found
to have led to an award on jurisdiction that was not publicly available. Of the

81. Aitken & Taroni, supra note 13 at 203; Shapiro, supra note 56 at 91-92.
82. Matthew Hall, “Randomness Reconsidered: Modeling Random Judicial Assignment in the
U.S. Courts of Appeals” (2010) 7:3 J Empirical Legal Stud 574 at 574-75.
83. Bingham, supra note 43 at 259.
84. Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, “Globalizing Commercial Litigation” (2008) 94:1
Cornell L Rev 1 at 34-35; Drahozal, “Judicial Incentives,” supra note 6 at 470.
85. Supra note 10 at 909.
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remaining 152 cases, 9 were unavailable in English and were not coded. Of the
remaining 143 cases, 3 had been consolidated with another case and were coded
only once under the consolidated case. Tis left 140 cases for content analysis.
Tese comprise the full universe of publicly available English-language awards in
known investment treaty cases that led to an award on jurisdictional matters by
the cut-of dates. Te cases arose primarily under BITs (74% of coded awards)
and secondarily under NAFTA (17%) and the ECT (8%). Of the 140 cases, there
were 25 in which no issue was found to have arisen, leaving 115 in which one
or more issues were found to have arisen. Of these 115 cases, there were 100 in
which at least one issue was resolved expansively or restrictively by the tribunal.
B. ANALYTICAL MODEL

An analytical model was developed based on eight primary measures of interest, one
dependent variable, and seven covariates that were used to test the hypotheses.86 Te
primary measures of interest were as follows:
•
•

Nationality of claimant. Te data included claimants with nationality
of 26 diferent states.
Identity of respondent state. Tere were 44 states among the respondents in the dataset.

For these frst two measures, Hypotheses 2 and 3 required an analysis of France,
Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, individually and as a
group, versus all others.87 Other groupings were analyzed to include a range
of measures associated with Western capital-exporting interests. Tese other
groupings were:
•
•
•

Te United States versus all others;
Te United Kingdom and the United States versus all others;
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom versus all others
(except the United States);

86. Te author was assisted by statistical experts in the project design and the data analysis. See
Lempert, supra note 10 at 922-23. Kelly Goldthorpe, a J.D. student and former statistical
analyst, advised on the project design and conducted the initial data analysis. Heather
Krause, a data analyst and statistical consultant, designed the model, carried out the
regression analysis, and provided a report on the dataset, model, and results as outlined in
Parts III and IV.
87. In a few cases where there were claimants with diferent nationalities, the case was classifed
as falling within the relevant grouping if at least one of the claimant nationalities fell within
the grouping.
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•
•
•

•

•
•
•
•

Western European former colonial powers88 versus all others (except
the United States);
Historical G-7 members89 versus all others;
The United Nations geographic classifications of states in
North America, Western Europe, Northern Europe, and
Southern Europe 90 versus all others;
Te United Nations classifcation of states in Eastern Europe91
versus all others (except North America, Western Europe, Northern
Europe, and Southern Europe);
Te Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) members as of 199092 versus all others;
Te OECD members as of 200093 versus all others;
World Bank classifcation of high income countries as of 199094
versus all others; and
World Bank classifcation of high income countries as of 200095
versus all others.

Treaty/treaty type. Tere were four treaties or treaty types in the data: BITs, NAFTA,
the ECT, and the ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments.96 As a descriptive fnding, there was a disproportionate representation of
88. Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom.
89. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States.
90. Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bermuda, Bosnia, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Gibraltar, Greece, Greenland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Serbia,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
91. Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia,
and the Ukraine.
92. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
93. Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, Slovakia, and South Korea, and all OECD
members as of 1990 (ibid).
94. Andorra, Aruba, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Bermuda, Brunei, Canada, Cyprus,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greenland, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Qatar, Singapore, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.
95. Barbados, Cayman Islands, Greece, Guam, Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco, Portugal and
Slovenia, and all high income countries as of 1990, ibid.
96. Agreement among the Government of Brunei Darussalam, the Republic of Indonesia, Malaysia,
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NAFTA cases among those in which no issue was found to have arisen, indicating
that the types of jurisdictional issues arising in NAFTA cases may have diverged
from those under BITs and the ECT.
Issue type. Tere were seven coded issues in the data. Te issue with the most
resolutions as expansive or restrictive was parallel claims. Te issue with the least
resolutions was natural person investor. Resolutions of this issue and another—
permissibility of an investment—were found in only a small number of cases.
Count of issues per case. Te total number of issues that arose and were decided
expansively or responsively ranged from 1 to 4 per case. Te mean and the
median were 2 resolutions per case.
Total appointments per arbitrator. Individual arbitrators in the data were appointed
between 1 and 14 times per arbitrator. Te mean number of appointments was 5
and the median was 3.
Case. Tere were 100 cases in the data in which a total of 527 unique issues arose
that were decided expansively or restrictively.
Arbitrator. Tere were 172 individuals appointed as arbitrators in the 100 cases.
Tere were 340 unique arbitrator/case combinations.
Te dependent variable was the issue resolution. A total of 180 issues arose and
were resolved expansively or restrictively in 100 cases. Tere were 515 distinct
instances in which an arbitrator was found to have resolved an issue expansively
or restrictively. Of these, 389 were expansive and 126 were restrictive.
C. ANALYSIS BASED ON GENERALIZED LINEAR MIXED EFFECTS MODEL

For Hypotheses 2 and 3, the analysis used a generalized linear mixed efects
model, with the issue resolution as a binary dependent variable. A generalized
linear mixed efects model is a combination of a linear mixed efects model and
a general linear model and is very similar to a classical general linear model. Te
most common generalized linear model is logistic regression, with the addition in
the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore and the Kingdom of Tailand for the
Promotion and Protection of Investments, 24 February 1976, 27 ILM 612 (entered into force
15 December 1987) [ASEAN Agreement]. Te model excluded the ASEAN Agreement because
it arose in only one case.
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the present case of random efects to the fxed efects that are treated in classical
regression. In a generalized linear model, the error distribution is assumed to be
in the exponential family as distinct from the special case of the normal family
in linear mixed efects models.97 Te model was designed in light of the data
structure, which nested information within both cases and arbitrators. Issues that
are nested will not be independent of each other and this required a model that
controlled for the resulting non-independence or correlation. Random efects
were used to account for this.
Te overall purpose of the model was to determine the likelihood that
potential predictors accounted for variations in issue resolutions as opposed to
those variations being explained by chance (statistical signifcance) and the degree
to which any of a series of potential predictors had an efect on variations in issue
resolutions (efect size). Tus, the analysis tested the possibility that observed
tendencies in issue resolutions were explained by chance and that the predictor
variables had no or minimal efect on the tendencies.

IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. ANTICIPATED TENDENCY TOWARD AN EXPANSIVE APPROACH
1.

OVERALL RESULTS

Hypothesis 1 predicted that arbitrators would tend to adopt an expansive
approach to the resolution of the coded issues. Te results supported this expectation. A one-sample binomial test was used to confrm this, generating a
signifcance level of p<0.001. Tus, the likelihood that the variation between
expansive and restrictive resolutions was explained by chance was extremely
low, making it safe to reject the null hypothesis that 50% of the resolutions
would be expansive and 50% restrictive. Table 2 summarizes the variation in
resolutions for individual issues. As indicated, there were diferent variances
and diferent amounts of data for each issue.
Te results indicated that the strong tendency in favour of an expansive
approach was driven by resolutions of four issues. On one issue (scope of mostfavour-nation treatment) arbitrators were split between expansive and restrictive
approaches, and on two issues (natural person investor and permissibility of
investment), there were insufcient data to draw conclusions. Hypothesis 1 was
supported by the overall result, across all issues, that expansive approaches to the
97. Russ Wolfnger & Michael O’Connell, “Generalized Linear Mixed Models: A PseudoLikelihood Approach” (1993) 48:3 J Statist Comput Simul 233.
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TABLE 2: CLASSIFICATION OF ISSUE RESOLUTIONS BY ISSUE
Resolution of issue
Issues

No. of issue
resolutions

Expansive (%)

Restrictive (%)

(1) corporate person investor

69

81.94

18.06

(2) natural person investor

6

0.00

100.00

(3) concept of investment

116

72.27

27.73

(4) minority shareholder interest

72

92.00

8.00

(5) permissibility of investment

27

66.67

33.33

(6) parallel claims

165

82.74

17.26

(7) scope of MFN treatment

60

50.00

50.00

515

76.09

23.91

Cumulative

resolution of disputed jurisdictional issues were about three times more common
than restrictive approaches.
2.

RESULTS OVER TIME

Te data were examined to determine whether the overall tendency toward
expansive resolutions varied over time. Te analysis was isolated by treaty/treaty
type. It showed that time was of no statistical signifcance in the prediction of
resolutions as expansive or restrictive, including when isolated by treaty/treaty
type. Figure 1 provides an outline of the distribution of resolutions over time by
year of claim98 and by year of award on jurisdictional matters.
3.

DISCUSSION

It is safe to say that tribunals favoured an expansive approach to the coded issues as a
whole, which enhanced the compensatory promise of the system for claimants and
the corresponding risk of liability for states. Tis result supported the hypothesis
that tested expectations that arbitrators would interpret the law in ways that
encourage claims and support the economic position of the arbitration industry.
Tis suggests that the interests of arbitrators may be a factor afecting resolution
of contested issues of investment treaty law.
Te results may not surprise observers who expect tribunals to take a
liberal approach to jurisdiction and to the admissibility of claims. Te author’s

98. Te earlier year was recorded as the year of claim in cases where the claimant fled a notice of
claim prior to and in a diferent year from the actual claim.
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preconception based on doctrinal study was that there would be a modest
tendency towards an expansive approach, although not to the degree observed.
Tentatively, the results may provide cause for concern for those who expect
the system to deliver a degree of evenness—between the interests of claimants
and respondent states—in the resolution of silence or ambiguity in investment
treaties.99 Yet, states lost across most of the coded contested issues, in some cases
overwhelmingly, in the litigation of jurisdictional objections to investor claims. If
states expected the relevant issues to be resolved restrictively, this has clearly not
been the case in practice.
Te results do not establish the truth of any theoretical expectation of
systemic bias; that is, they do not establish all of the steps of logic that would
be required to connect the observed tendency to the underlying rationales for the
hypothesis. It is noteworthy that the overall tendency was driven by four issues
and that, for all issues, restrictive approaches were adopted by some arbitrators.
In this respect, the fndings indicate that some arbitrators go against the grain by
adopting restrictive approaches. Tus, assuming that the fndings supported the
FIGURE 1: TOTAL ISSUE RESOLUTIONS AND % THAT WERE EXPANSIVE (BY YEAR
OF AWARD)

Total Count
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99. Some arbitrators, including commentators, present the system in these terms. See e.g.
Federico Orrego-Vicuña, “Arbitrating Investment Disputes” International Council for
Commercial Arbitration (2008), online: <http://www.arbitration-icca.org/index.html>.
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hypothesis, other factors clearly must also play a role in arbitrator behaviour.
Finally, the results should not be taken as evidence of actual bias on the part of
any individual or in any specifc case.
B. ANTICIPATED ACCENTUATION OF THE EXPANSIVE TENDENCY IN
CASES BROUGHT BY CLAIMANTS FROM FRANCE, GERMANY, THE
UNITED KINGDOM, OR THE UNITED STATES
1.

OVERALL RESULTS

Hypothesis 2 predicted that the anticipated tendency in favour of an expansive
approach would be accentuated where the claimant was a national of France,
Germany, the United Kingdom, or the United States. Tese states were identifed
at the outset as a measure of major Western capital-exporting states. Te measure
was supplemented by analyses of additional groupings associated with Western
capital-exporting interests. Te hypothesis related to predictive factors that could
infuence variances in issue resolutions across cases. Te aim of the model was to
test the data by controlling for diferent potential predictors of variances in issue
resolutions and by mitigating the risk of overstatement of the signifcance or
efect of any predictor. Te fxed efects controlled for were
•
•
•
•
•

Te claimant’s state of nationality;
Te specifc issue among the coded issues;
Te treaty or treaty type;
Te total appointments per arbitrator; and
Te total issue resolutions per case.

Accounting for these variables, the model was well suited to the data structure,
generating an F (F=13.79, 8, 93) that was signifcantly lower than the critical
F value, with a p<0.001. Tus, it was safe to reject the null hypothesis on the
basis of statistically signifcant evidence of a relationship between the response
variable and all predictor variables or covariates simultaneously. Table 3 outlines
the results of the regression analysis.
Te data were tested for efect sizes. A commonly used measure of efect
size in regression analysis is the R-squared statistic. Te R-squared statistic is
a goodness-of-ft statistic that can be applied to regression models in order to
measure the amounts of the variation in the dependent variable that are being
explained by each of the predictor variables. Tis goodness-of-ft measure is widely
used to measure the amount of variance in the dependent variable that can be
attributed to individual predictors in regression models. No precise measure of
R-squared is available for generalized linear mixed models, but there is a formula
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for calculating a McFadden pseudo R-squared for generalized linear models.100
Te formula generates a pseudo statistic that should be treated as an approximation.101
If there is an error, the pseudo R-squared statistic will tend to underestimate,
rather than overestimate, the strength of the association.
TABLE 3: REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE MODEL
Variable

Estimate

Std. error

p-value

Claimant nationality

0.59

0.52

<0.001

Issue

-0.68

0.16

0.003

Treaty/treaty type

-0.06

0.62

0.01

Total issue resolutions in the case

0.42

0.21

0.05

Arbitrator total appointments

0.11

0.05

0.01

Dependent variable: Issue Resolution

For the model as a whole, the McFadden pseudo R-squared was 0.20, which
can be taken as an approximate indicator that the model explains 20% of the
variance in the probability of whether an issue resolution is expansive or restrictive. In
terms of the individual predictor variables, the changes in the pseudo R-squared
were as follows:
•
•
•
•
•

Claimant’s state of nationality (primary grouping of France,
Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States): 0.08;
Specifc issue among the coded issues: 0.08;
Category of treaty or treaty type: 0.07;
Total appointments per arbitrator: 0.02;
Total issue resolutions in the case: 0.02;

Tus, using the generalized linear mixed efects model, in 515 issue resolutions
over 100 cases there was evidence of a strong tendency in favour of an
accentuated expansive approach where the claimant was a national of a Western
capital-exporting state. Tis was most apparent for cases under a BIT or the
ECT, for four of the coded issues, and for issue resolutions by frequently
appointed arbitrators. Te evidence was statistically signifcant in that there
100. Shinichi Nakagawa & Innes C Cuthill, “Efect size, confdence interval and statistical
signifcance: a practical guide for biologists” (2007) 82:4 Biological Rev 591; A Colin
Cameron & Frank AG Windmeijer, “An R-squared measure of goodness of ft for some
common nonlinear regression models” (1997) 77:2 J Econometrics 329.
101. Te statistic is pseudo in that it is an approximation based on a comparison of the log
likelihood in the models, which is a measure of the magnitude of the error terms in the
estimation.
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was an extremely low risk that the observed variance in issue resolutions was
explained by chance. Te results are elaborated below.
2.

RESULTS BASED ON CLAIMANT NATIONALITY: PRIMARY GROUPING

Hypothesis 2 predicted that the anticipated tendency toward an expansive
approach would be accentuated in cases brought by claimants with the nationality of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Based on
the relative position of these states as capital-exporters, a detailed expectation was
that the accentuated tendency would be strongest for US claimants followed by
the other three states. Te analysis was organized as follows:
•
•
•
•
•

Group 1A: France;
Group 1B: Germany;
Group 1C: United Kingdom;
Group 1D: United States;
Group 1E: all other states;

Overall, the efect of claimant nationality for this grouping was statistically
signifcant (F=5.78, 5, 93; p<0.001). Table 4 provides the probability of an issue
being resolved expansively for each of the fve categories of claimant nationality
when all other covariates are held steady.
TABLE 4: EFFECTS OF CLAIMANT NATIONALITY (GROUPING #1) ON THE LIKELIHOOD
OF AN EXPANSIVE RESOLUTION
Probability of expansive
resolution

Statistical signifcance

France

0.86

p=0.005

Germany

0.47

p=0.38

United Kingdom

0.95

p<0.001

United States

0.98

p<0.001

All others

0.69

p<0.001

Claimant nationality

Besides the overall efect, the analysis demonstrated that the country-bycountry variances between claimants from France, the United Kingdom, or the
United States and claimants from other states were all statistically signifcant.
Te results thus confrmed the detailed expectation that the strongest accentuation of the expansive approach would be for US claimants, followed by the
other three states. However, there was limited country-specifc data for Germany
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and France. Of the 100 cases, 30 involved a US claimant,102 9 a UK claimant,103
6 a French claimant,104 and 5 a German claimant.105 Also, the hypothesis was
not supported by the results for Germany. Tere was no statistically signifcant
diference between German claimants and claimants from other states; moreover,
there was an apparent tendency toward a less expansive approach for German
claimants although this country-specifc fnding was not statistically signifcant
in that it was accompanied by an unacceptable risk (36%) that the variance
was explained by chance.
3.

RESULTS BASED ON CLAIMANT NATIONALITY: ADDITIONAL
GROUPINGS

Te robustness of the fndings for the primary grouping was tested by analyzing
other groupings of claimant nationalities associated with Western capital-exporting
interests.106 Additional evidence was found of an accentuated tendency toward
an expansive approach in cases brought by claimants from the United States, the
United States or the United Kingdom, a G-7 state, a Western European former
colonial power, and an OECD member state as of 1990 or 2000. Te fndings
for each of these groupings were statistically signifcant. Similar tendencies were
observed for other groupings based on United Nations geographic classifcations
and World Bank income classifcations, but the fndings were not statistically
signifcant. A detailed report of the further analyses is provided in Table 5.
Te analyses for these other groupings supported the fnding on the primary
grouping. Tat is, they supported the expectation that claimants from Western
102. As a descriptive fnding, in 30 cases brought by a US claimant, 47 coded issues were resolved
expansively or restrictively (leading to 140 distinct issue resolutions by individual arbitrators
in those cases). Tere were 128 expansive resolutions and 12 restrictive resolutions. Te cases
were spread among 12 respondent states.
103. As a descriptive fnding, in 9 cases brought by a UK claimant, 17 coded issues were resolved
expansively or restrictively (leading to 49 distinct issue resolutions by individual arbitrators in
those cases). Tere were 42 expansive resolutions and 7 restrictive resolutions. Te cases were
spread among 6 respondent states.
104. As a descriptive fnding, in 6 cases brought by a French claimant, 15 coded issues were resolved
expansively or restrictively (leading to 45 distinct issue resolutions by individual arbitrators in
those cases). Tere were 36 expansive resolutions and 9 restrictive resolutions. Notably, 5 of the
cases were against Argentina; the remaining case was against the Dominican Republic.
105. As a descriptive fnding, in 5 cases brought by a German claimant, 8 coded issues were
resolved expansively or restrictively (leading to 24 distinct issue resolutions by individual
members of the tribunal in those cases). Tere were 13 expansive resolutions and 11
restrictive resolutions. Te cases were spread among 4 respondent states (Argentina, the
Philippines, Russia, and the Ukraine).
106. Tese analyses did not fow from any detailed country-specifc expectations.
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TABLE 5: RESULTS OF ANALYSES OF ADDITIONAL GROUPINGS OF CLAIMANT
NATIONALITIES
Grouping

Summary of results

Grouping #2
Group 2A: US (n=140)
Group 2B: all other states (n=375)

Te grouping had a statistically signifcant efect (F=15.43,
2, 95, p<0.001). Claimants from the US were 91% more
likely to beneft from an expansive resolution than claimants
from all other states combined.

Grouping #3
Group 3A: France, Germany, and UK
(n=100)
Group 3B: All other states (except US)
(n=275)

Te grouping had an overall statistically signifcant efect
(F=13.47, 2, 95, p<0.001). Claimants from a state in Group
3A were 55% more likely to beneft from an expansive
resolution than claimants from all other states combined,
other than the US.

Grouping #4
Group 4A: UK, US (n=189)
Group 4B: All other states (n=326)

Te grouping had an overall statistically signifcant efect
(F=30.52, 11, p<0.001). Claimants from the UK or the
US were 90% more likely to beneft from an expansive
resolution than claimants from all other states combined.

Grouping #5
Group 5A: France, Germany, UK, US
(n=258)
Group 5B: All other states (n=257)

Te grouping had an overall statistically signifcant efect
(F=19.42, 2, 95, p<0.001). Claimants from a state listed
in Group 5A were 84% more likely to beneft from an
expansive resolution than claimants from all other states
combined.

Grouping #6
Group 6A: historical G-7 states (n=297)
Group 6B: All other states (n=218)

Te grouping had an overall statistically signifcant efect
(F=12.06, 2, 95, p<0.005). Claimants from a state in
Group 6A were 22% more likely to beneft from an expansive resolution than claimants from all other states combined.
Notably, there were no cases in Group 6A involving a claimant from Japan.

Grouping #7
Group 7A: Western European former
colonial powers (n=187)
Group 7B: All other states (except US)
(n=188)

Te grouping had an overall statistically signifcant efect
(F=15.32, 2, 95, p<0.006). Claimants from a state in
Group 7A were 75% more likely to beneft from an expansive resolution than claimants from all other states combined,
other than the US.

Grouping #8
Group 8A: States in North America,
Western Europe, Southern Europe, and
Northern Europe (n=428)
Group 8B: All other states (n=87)

Te grouping did not have an overall statistically significant effect (F=2.16, 2, 95, p<0.14). Claimants from
states in Group 8A were 69% more likely to benefit
from an expansive resolution than claimants from all
other states, but the efect was not statistically signifcant
because it carried a 14% probability that it was explained
by chance. Notably, as a descriptive fnding, 83% of total
issue resolutions arose in cases brought by a claimant from
a state in Group 8A.

Grouping #9
Group 9A: States in Eastern Europe
Group 9B: All others (except states in
North America, Western Europe, Southern
Europe, and Northern Europe)

Te grouping could not be tested because there was insuffcient data on claimant nationalities in Group 9A.
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Grouping #10
Group 10A: OECD members as of 1990
(n=422)
Group 10B: All other states (n=93)

Te grouping had an overall statistically signifcant efect
(F=15.19, 2, 95, p<0.001). Claimants from states in
Group 10A were 16% more likely to beneft from an
expansive resolution than claimants from all other states.

Grouping #11
Group 11A: OECD members as of 2000
(n=425)
Group 11B: All others (n=90)

Te grouping had an overall statistically significant
effect (F=24.75, 2, 95, p<0.001). Claimants from states
in Group 11A were 15% more likely to beneft from an
expansive resolution than claimants from all other states
combined.

Group #12
Group 12A: High income states as of
1990 (n=411)
Group 12B: All other states (n=104)

Te grouping did not have an overall statistically signifcant
efect (F=1.53, 2, 95, p<0.46). Claimants from states in
Group 12A were 40% more likely to beneft from an
expansive resolution, but the efect was not statistically
signifcant because it carried a 46% probability that it was
explained by chance. Notably, as a descriptive fnding,
80% of total issues resolutions arose in cases brought by a
claimant from a state in Group 12A.

Group #13
Group 13A: High income states as of
2000 (n=422)
Group 13B: All other (n=93)

The grouping did not have an overall statistically
significant efect (F=1.37, p<0.73). Claimants from states
in Group 13A were 50% more likely to beneft from an
expansive resolution, but the efect was not statistically
signifcant because it carried a 73% likelihood that it
happened by chance. Notably, as a descriptive fnding,
82% of total issues resolutions arose in cases brought by a
claimant from a state in Group 13A.

capital-exporting states would tend to beneft from an accentuated expansive
approach to the resolution of the coded issues.
4.

RESULTS BASED ON THE SPECIFIC ISSUE

A fxed efect, controlled for in the model, was the specifc issue among the seven
that were coded. Tere was a variation in the tendency toward expansive or
restrictive approaches depending on the specifc issue. Te variations among
the issues had a statistically signifcant efect on issue resolutions (F=14.19, 6,
208, p<0.001). Te size of this efect was 0.08, meaning as a best estimate that
issue-by-issue variation accounted for 8% of the overall variance in expansive or
restrictive interpretations. Te fnding highlighted the importance of focusing
on the fve coded issues for which there was sufcient data in the comparison of
issue-by-issue tendencies. It also indicated that both the general tendency toward
expansive resolutions and the accentuated tendency based on claimant nationality
were driven by four issues. Figure 2 outlines the issue-by-issue results across the
100 cases.
For two issues, natural person investor and permissibility of investment,
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FIGURE 2: BREAKDOWN OF ISSUE RESOLUTIONS BY SPECIFIC ISSUE
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there were limited data. For one issue, scope of most-favoured-nation treatment,
arbitrators were divided between expansive and restrictive resolutions. For the
remaining four issues, there was a strong tendency toward an expansive approach.
It should be emphasized that these issue-by-issue results are descriptive fndings.
Only the overall tendency for all issues was the subject of focussed analysis in the
statistical model. Tere were no expectations about how frequently each of the
issues would arise and be resolved expansively or restrictively.
5.

RESULTS BASED ON TREATY/TREATY TYPE

Te model included an examination of possible variances in issue resolutions
among three diferent treaties/treaty types: BITs, the ECT, and NAFTA. Te
analysis revealed that variations in the treaty/ treaty type had a statistically signifcant efect on the variance in issue resolutions (F=10.79, 2, 95, p<0.001) with an
efect size of 7%. Issues in cases under NAFTA had the lowest probability of being resolved expansively and this was a statistically signifcant diference relative
to cases under BITs and the ECT. On the other hand, there were no statistically
signifcant diferences between BITs and the ECT.
TABLE 6: EFFECTS OF TREATY/TREATY TYPE ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN
EXPANSIVE RESOLUTION
Treaty/ treaty type

Probability

p-value

Bilateral investment treaty (BIT)

0.95

0.00008

Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)

0.97

0.0022

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)

0.77

0.94
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Table 6 outlines the log-odds of the efects of the diferent categories of treaty
or treaty type.
Figure 3 illustrates the probability of an expansive resolution for each treaty
or treaty type when all other covariates are held constant.
Tese results indicate that the resolution of issues under NAFTA appears
to have a distinct trajectory. Although the data were limited for NAFTA and
ECT cases,107 issues were less likely to be resolved expansively under NAFTA. Te
observed tendencies for Hypotheses 1 and 2 were driven by BITs and the ECT.
6.

RESULTS BASED ON TOTAL APPOINTMENTS PER ARBITRATOR

Te model included an analysis of the impact of the frequency of appointment of
arbitrators on variance in issue resolutions. Tis variable was added to the model after
the data were collected and it was noticed that the twenty-four individual arbitrators
FIGURE 3: PROBABILITY OF EXPANSIVE RESOLUTION FOR TREATY/TREATY TYPE
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107. Tere were 419 resolutions in cases under BITs, 39 in cases under NAFTA, and 48 in cases
under the ECT.
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who had each resolved more than fve issues were as a group responsible for nearly
half of total issue resolutions.108 To evaluate this potential predictor, the variable
of total count of appointments per arbitrator was added to the model. Te analysis
revealed statistically signifcant evidence that frequently appointed arbitrators were
more likely to resolve issues expansively (F=4.41, 1, 194, p=0.03). However, the
efect size of 0.02 was small relative to other variables, indicating as a best estimate
that 2% of the variance in issue resolutions was explained by this variable. Tus,
while the variable contributed to the overall model on a statistically signifcant
basis, it was not important relative to other variables as a predictor of variance in
issue resolutions.
7.

RESULTS BASED ON TOTAL ISSUE RESOLUTIONS PER CASE

Te unit of analysis was issues, not cases or arbitrators. Tis allowed an examination of
resolutions by arbitrators of a variety of issues in investment treaty law.109 However,
it was anticipated that this approach could give greater weight to cases in which
multiple issues were resolved and skew possibly the tendency toward an expansive
or restrictive approach. To test for this, the variable of total issue resolutions
per case was included in the model as a fxed efect. Te variable was statistically
signifcant (p=0.05), so it was important to include it as a control variable. Te
change in the pseudo R-squared that was accounted for by this variable was 0.02,
indicating that the total number of issue resolutions per case accounted for about
2% of the variance in issue resolutions. Te general tendency was that, as the
total issue resolutions increased per case, so did the likelihood that the issues
would be resolved expansively. However, the efect size of .02 was small relative to
other variables in the model. Tus, it was not important as an isolated predictor
of variance in issue resolutions.
8.

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS FOR HYPOTHESIS 2

Te fndings supported the expectation that arbitrators would resolve issues
diferently where the claimant was a national of a Western capital-exporting
state. Issue resolutions in cases brought by claimants from France, Germany,
the United Kingdom, and the United States, as a group that was expected to
beneft from a systemic bias, were 84% more likely to be resolved expansively.
Tis fnding was supported by analyses of other groupings associated with Western
108. Recent studies have also examined aspects of the role of frequently appointed or “elite”
investment arbitrators in arbitrator behaviour. See Kapeliuk, supra note 20 at 68 and 88-89;
Costa, supra note 1.
109. See Shapiro, supra note 56 at 97-100.
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capital-exporting interests. Te tendency was statistically signifcant with a
modest efect size among the individual variables that contributed to an overall
strong efect. Tus, the strongest fnding was that claimants from major Western
capital-exporting states who bring claims under a BIT or the ECT (as opposed to
NAFTA) that raise four of the coded issues, before frequently appointed arbitrators,
are more likely to beneft from an expansive approach. By extension, it can be
inferred that a respondent state, although at a disadvantage on such issues relative
to investors generally, is more likely to beneft from a restrictive approach where
the claimant has the nationality of a state other than a major Western capitalexporter, where the claim is under NAFTA, and where the arbitrators are not
frequently appointed.
Although the fndings confrmed the hypothesis, there are a range of possible
explanations for this tendency and further inferences are necessary to connect it
to underlying rationales. Te fndings also do not provide evidence of actual bias
on the part of any individual or in any particular case; the observed tendencies were
at a systemic level and were limited to issues of jurisdiction and admissibility. Also,
although based on limited data, the experience of German claimants provided an
apparent exception to the anticipated tendency. On the other hand, the results
for other groupings confrmed that the tendency is not limited to the experience
of claimants from the United Kingdom, the United States, and France.
Te author did not have any preconception about whether the relevant
hypothesis would be supported, other than an expectation that there would be
insufcient data to support statistically signifcant fndings. Te results were
therefore surprising. Observers might anticipate that the resolution of contested
issues in investment treaty law, arising from ambiguous language in the treaties,
does not vary signifcantly based on claimant nationality. Tis is a basic proposition of neutrality and impartiality in adjudication. In this respect, the fndings
spotlight the question of whether the apparent interests of arbitrators to appease
major states and their investors may help to explain these results. However, while
a series of economic factors provided rationales for the study’s hypotheses, they
are not the only possible explanation. Alternative explanations may include: factual
or contextual variations that encourage arbitrators to bend the law in order to
assume or decline jurisdiction depending on claimant nationality; ideological
preferences that cause arbitrators to be more dubious of the legal arguments of
capital-importing or non-Western or states and their nationals; variations in the
quality of legal representation or the wisdom of appointment decisions among
diferent claimant nationalities; variations in the degree to which specifc cases
infuence interpretations adopted in subsequent cases; disproportionate infuence
by a small cohort of frequently appointed arbitrators who are represented on
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many tribunals; structural factors such as the role of appointing authorities in
choosing arbitrators; or a complex and varying mix of these and other possible
explanations.110
Tus, the study is tentative and conditional. Yet, whatever the explanation
for the results, the fact that the observed tendencies exist in the coded data and
are unlikely to be explained by chance invites further discussion. Te results also
give cause for consideration by policy makers of the purpose of investment treaties
and the degree to which investment arbitration allows for fair and adequate
representation of diferent interests. Most importantly, the fndings highlight
that perceptions of bias, based on discrete but essential aspects of arbitrator decision
making, may arise on credible grounds in the absence of conventional safeguards of
judicial independence.
C. ANTICIPATED REDUCTION OF THE EXPANSIVE TENDENCY IN CASES
AGAINST FRANCE, GERMANY, THE UNITED KINGDOM, OR THE UNITED
STATES

Hypothesis 3 was that the anticipated tendency in favour of an expansive
approach would be diminished where the respondent state was France, Germany,
the United Kingdom, or the United States. Due to limited data, the analysis did
not demonstrate any statistically signifcant patterns or any efect size of interest
for this hypothesis. Tere were no cases against France, Germany, or the United
Kingdom and only a small number of issue resolutions in cases against the United
States.111 It was thus not possible to test the hypothesis reliably. Supplementary
analyses based on other groupings were not carried out due to the lack of data.
D. SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSIS OF CASE OUTCOMES AT THE
JURISDICTIONAL STAGE

In light of past studies on case outcomes,112 the data were analyzed against jurisdictional outcomes in each case. To what extent was the jurisdictional outcome
110. Sisk & Heise, supra note 10 at 746; Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 41 at 1129; Rogers,
“Te Arrival,” supra note 24 at 357-58; Choi & Gulati, supra note 18 at 739; Fauchald, supra
note 37 at 337-38; Kapeliuk, supra note 20 at 68-69; and Leiter, supra note 14 at 277-78.
111. As a descriptive fnding, in 3 cases brought against the United States, 5 coded issues were
resolved expansively or restrictively (leading to 15 distinct issue resolutions by individual
arbitrators in those cases). All of the resolutions were restrictive.
112. Dezalay & Garth, supra note 30; Fauchald, supra note 37; McArthur & Ormachea, supra
note 37; Franck, “Development and Outcomes,” supra note 37; Franck, “Te ICSID Efect,”
supra note 37; Kapeliuk, supra note 20; Gallagher & Shrestha, supra note 37; and Costa,
supra note 1.
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of the case associated with any of the explanatory variables explored in the study?
Te only fnding of note on this question was the descriptive fnding that there
was a clear tendency toward tribunals assuming jurisdiction in the 100 cases
analyzed. However, the tendency was not explained on a statistically signifcant
basis by any of the variables explored in the model. In general, this was due to
the lack of data; the small number of cases in which jurisdiction was denied meant
that it was not possible to partition the variance in outcomes in a meaningful way.

V. CONCLUSION
Te study was based on a content analysis of arbitrators’ resolutions of contested
issues of jurisdiction and admissibility in investment treaty law. Te method of
content analysis was used in part to avoid limitations in outcome-based research.
A beneft of content analysis, from the perspective of legal scholarship, is that it
assigns a greater value-added role for legal expertise alongside statistical expertise.113
On the other hand, content analysis is complex and relies for its validity on the
replicability of the coding process and transparency of the coded results. Analysis
of data on arbitrator decision-making provides one way in which to research
arbitrator behaviour, but should be applied in tandem with other methods.
Read alongside other studies in the feld, the study highlights that the results
of empirical research on possible bias will vary according to the questions asked,
methods used, project design, and inferences drawn. Given the diversity of
approaches, it is not surprising that there is mixed (often inconclusive) evidence
regarding possible bias in investment arbitration. Tis study contributes to the
literature by its choice of method and by its fndings of statistically signifcant
evidence in support of specifc hypotheses. Tere was strong support for the
anticipated tendency toward an expansive approach in the resolution of contested
issues of jurisdiction and admissibility and for the expected accentuation of this
tendency for claimants from France, Germany, the United Kingdom, or the
United States. Te experience of German claimants, based on limited data, was a
possible exception. Te overall fnding was supported by analyses of other groupings
of Western capital-exporting states, such as G-7 members, Western European
former colonial powers, and OECD members. Te evidence was strongest for
cases under a BIT or the ECT, for four of the coded issues, and for frequently
appointed arbitrators.

113. Hall & Wright, supra note 7 at 64.
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Te study is subject to limitations as summarized in the introduction and
elaborated in the text. Briefy, empirical legal methods have much to contribute
in the collection and analysis of data on adjudicative decision making, but their
capacity to resolve questions of possible bias is inherently limited. Empirical
research cannot resolve issues of possible bias in any particular case and, even at
a systemic level, any empirical project should be understood as an attempt not to
prove or disprove possible bias, but rather to falsify discrete expectations arising
from aspects of a decision-making mechanism.114 Tere will always be a range of
possible explanations for observed tendencies and this study is not—nor is there
likely ever to be—a fnal word on whether there is systemic bias in the system.115
What is clear from the study is that the observed tendencies on the resolution
of jurisdictional issues exist in the coded data and are unlikely to be explained by
chance. Te main conclusions drawn from this, based on the author’s inferences,
are as follows. First, in the context of arbitrator resolutions of contested jurisdictional issues, there is tentative support for expectations of systemic bias arising
from the interests of arbitrators in light of the system’s asymmetrical claims structure
and the absence of conventional markers of judicial independence. Second, the
results of this study suggest a need for further scrutiny and evaluation of the
design and performance of investment treaty arbitration. Tird, based on legal
doctrine and comparative institutional analysis, there is reason to take a cautious
approach to the risk of actual bias in an adjudicative system of public importance
by adopting institutional safeguards to reduce any reasonably perceived bias arising
from the system’s structure or performance.

114. Lempert, supra note 10 at 916.
115. Sisk & Heise, supra note 10 at 794.

VAN HARTEN, ARBITRATOR BEHAVIOUR 253

APPENDIX ONE
Summary of existing empirical studies related to the research question
A key work in the literature is the qualitative study of international arbitration by
Dezalay and Garth based on interviews of about 300 participants in the feld. Te
authors made a series of observations that provide context for the expectations of
systemic bias that are tested here.116 Teir main conclusion was that arbitrators
operate in a marketplace in which each is a supplier of symbolic capital arising
from his or her reputation.117 It was also observed that the arbitrators, especially
the new generation of entrepreneurs, seek to appeal to those who have power in
the club and marketplace of international arbitration. Te study provides useful
background for expectations about arbitrator behaviour where arbitration incorporates an asymmetrical structure of claims in the absence of conventional markers
of independence.118 However, the study is dated and may not necessarily explain
the behaviour of investment treaty arbitrators.
In an innovative study, Fauchald reviewed awards in 92 ICSID cases in
order to evaluate tribunals’ interpretive arguments.119 Te study ofered insights
into the extent and style of diferent forms of legal reasoning. Te study was not
framed in terms of any expectation of possible bias; however, for present purposes,
by systematically tracking the diferent interpretive approaches of tribunals, it
demonstrated the interpretive discretion of tribunals in the resolution of legal
issues. For example, among other fndings, Fauchald found that tribunals preferred
an objective approach to treaty interpretation but in practice often did not closely
examine the exact wording of relevant provisions; that tribunals referred to the
object and purpose of a treaty but often did not refer to specifc sources for
that object and purpose; that tribunals relied heavily on other ICSID case law
but often deviated from previous case law; and that tribunals regarded legal
doctrine—writings by experts in investment law, many of whom are themselves
arbitrators—as one of the most important interpretive arguments.
In a quantitative study of 74 investment arbitration cases at the ICSID,
McArthur and Ormachea collected information on jurisdictional outcomes,

116. Supra note 30.
117. Ibid at 8-9, 18, 36, 70, 194.
118. Cooter, supra note 19; Shimon Shetreet, Judges on Trial, ed by Gordon J Borrie (Amsterdam:
North Holland, 1976).
119. Supra note 37.
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although their fndings were not tested statistically.120 Tey highlighted (highly
tentative) fndings that tribunals rarely dismissed claims on jurisdictional grounds,
were more likely to dismiss claims on jurisdictional grounds where the claim was
brought under an investment contract rather than an investment treaty, and were
less likely to dismiss claims by investors from the wealthiest countries. Tese
and other results of the study were presented, appropriately, in descriptive terms.
To the extent that the authors drifted into predictive claims,121 the conclusions
should be discounted due to the lack of an a priori hypothesis and any statistical
testing of the data.
In a study of 52 investment treaty cases, Susan Franck provided useful
information on the system.122 Based on fndings that there was no statistically
signifcant evidence of a link between case outcomes and the development status
of presiding arbitrators and respondent states, Franck concluded that the system
appeared to be functioning fairly. Te study was rigorous in various respects and
its results were tested for signifcance and efects. However, some conclusions
were misstated or overstated given that the study did not reject the null hypothesis
that development status would afect outcome.123 Put diferently, the study did
not produce reliable evidence to support or refute expectations of possible bias
based on development status.124 Notably, in a recent study using the same dataset,
120. Ibid.
121. Ibid. See, for example, the statements in the study’s conclusion that the results indicated “that
investors are always better of relying on a BIT to establish jurisdiction” (at 582) and that
“claims are most likely to fail against those very same countries where an investor had the
best reasons to demand international arbitration protections” (at 583).
122. “Development and Outcomes,” supra note 37. See also Susan D Franck, “Empirically
Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration” (2007) 86:1 NCL Rev 1.
123. “Development and Outcomes,” ibid. Te study’s abstract notes that:
[t]he results demonstrate that, at the macro level, development status does not have a
statistically signifcant relationship with outcome. Tis suggests that the investment treaty
arbitration system, as a whole, functions fairly and that the eradication or radical overhaul of
the arbitration process is unnecessary (at 435).

Further, the study concludes with a statement that:
[t]he notion that outcome is not associated with arbitrator or respondent development
status… provides evidence about the integrity of arbitration and casts doubt on the
assumption that arbitrators from developed states show a bias in terms of arbitration
outcomes or that the development status of respondent states afect[s] such outcomes (at
487).

124. Te study sought to test expectations of bias linked to development status by classifying
arbitrator nationalities and respondent states based on the measures of OECD membership
and World Bank income classifcations. See Gus Van Harten “Reply” in Yearbook on
International Investment Law & Policy 2010-2011, ed by Karl P Sauvant (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2011) at 925-33.
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Franck did not fnd statistically signifcant evidence of a diference in outcomes
in ICSID investment arbitrations relative to outcomes at other arbitration
forums.125 While the study is in some respects used by the researcher to arrive
at broad conclusions, it appears mainly to confrm the lack of data in the feld
and should not be taken to have generated reliable evidence on the presence or
absence of possible bias in ICSID arbitration relative to other forums.
In a study of 131 ICSID cases, Kapeliuk provided useful descriptive information about the system, although the data was not tested for signifcance or
efects.126 It was found that 15% of arbitrators served on four or more ICSID
tribunals and that at least one of these “elite” arbitrators participated in 80% of
cases. In terms of outcomes, arbitrators were very unlikely to ‘split the diference’
by awarding 40% to 60% of the amount claimed. Most awards dismissed the
investor’s claim and over 80% of decisions (in favour of the claimant) awarded
less than 40% of the claimed amount. Te study found no apparent diferences
in decision making on outcomes by elite as opposed to other arbitrators. However,
the study did not report any hypothesis and, given the limited data,127 it should
be assumed that the fndings likely carry an unacceptable risk that they are
explained by chance. For this reason, the fndings should be treated as descriptive and tentative, and bold or predictive claims by the researcher should be
discounted accordingly.128
In a study of 105 investment treaty cases, Gallagher and Shrestha ofered
descriptive information based on analysis of claims and case outcomes.129 Tey
found that developing countries were disproportionately subjected to claims in
raw terms and relative to their share of global investment fows. Tey found also
that US claimants brought a high proportion of claims against developing countries,
that US claimants lost more cases than they won, and that the US government
won all cases as respondent. Te researchers noted the limited nature of the data
and outlined their fndings appropriately in descriptive terms. Tey also noted
that there are many investor-state disputes that do not proceed to formal arbitration
and that are not captured by the quantitative research.
“Te ICSID Efect,” supra note 37.
Supra note 20.
Ibid at 86-88 (by way of example, the discussion of awards by individual arbitrators).
Ibid. Te study’s abstract notes that “[t]he research shows that repeat arbitrators display no
biases and no tendencies to ‘split the diference’” (at 47), and in the conclusion the author
states that the results “clearly defy any claim that investment arbitration tribunals display a
tendency to rule in favour of investors” (at 90).
129. Supra note 37.

125.
126.
127.
128.
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In a comparative study of ICSID arbitration and WTO dispute settlement,
Costa collected information on 273 individuals who served as ICSID arbitrators
and on 212 individuals who served as WTO panelists from 1972–2009.130
He found that repeat appointments were much more common, and that a
small group of elite arbitrators played a more central role, in ICSID arbitration.
Tus, 12 individuals accounted for nearly 25% of all appointments in ICSID
cases and were present on the ICSID tribunal in 60% of cases. Te study provided
an interesting, if highly targeted, update to the qualitative work of Dezalay and
Garth,131 and, based on the same theoretical framework, the researcher highlighted the system’s need for individuals “who can provide technically correct
decisions and the special aura given by sanctifed arbitrators” for the legitimization
of investment arbitration on a case-by-case basis.132

130. Supra note 1.
131. Supra note 30.
132. Costa, supra note 1 at 16.
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APPENDIX TWO
Investment treaty arbitration coding project – issues classifcation template
(June 2009)
Issue 1: “corporate person investor” – expansive approach133
Flexible approach to claims for holding companies, indicated by:
(a) Prioritization of corporate form over control of the investment vehicle
or rejection of an implied origin-of-capital test;
(b) Allowance of a claim by a foreign company that is owned and likely
controlled by nationals of the host state;
OR
(c) Allowance of a claim by a shareholder whose investment in the host
state is owned by an intermediary company of a third state.
Note: Allowance of a claim by a foreign company or natural person whose ownership
of the investment extends through a chain of companies running from the host
state to the home state, but does not extend into any third state or end in the host
state, does not qualify as an expansive approach.
Note: An award is non-classifable where the issue is dealt with expressly and
specifcally in the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis

133. Modeled on: (1) Tokios Tokelės v Ukraine (2004), 20 ICSID Rev 205 (International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes) [Tokios] (majority reasons on jurisdiction, which
allowed a claim by a foreign company that was 98% owned by nationals of the respondent
state, thus favouring corporate form over substantive control of the investment vehicle,
denying an implied origin-of-capital test, and refusing to pierce the corporate veil); (2) Aguas
del Tunari SA v Republic of Bolivia (2005), 20 ICSID Rev 450 (International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes) [Aguas] (majority reasons on jurisdiction, which allowed
a claim by a foreign holding company despite the recent migration of the investment by
the ultimate owners to a Dutch holding company after a dispute with the host government
was developing, thus preferencing the principle of legal rather than factual control by the
corporate claimant); and (3) Société Générale v Dominican Republic (2008), LCIA Case No
UN 7927 (London Court of International Arbitration) (which allowed a claim despite a
byzantine corporate structure whereby the corporate claimant was several steps removed
from frst-level foreign investor). See also Campbell McLachlan, Laurence Shore & Matthew
Weiniger, International Investment Arbitration – Substantive Principles (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008) at 191-93.
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of the tribunal’s reasoning. On the present issue, a treaty does not satisfy this
threshold unless it expressly and specifcally allows claims by foreign holding
companies regardless of their ultimate ownership and control. A treaty that refers
generally to “direct and indirect” ownership of the investment does not satisfy
this threshold.
Note: A tribunal’s reasoning on minority shareholder claims and interests may
relate to the issue of ‘corporate person investor’ and to that of ‘minority shareholder interest’ (see below). A degree of coding overlap may therefore be unavoidable, leading in some cases to entry of an award under both issues. Tat
said, a distinction should be maintained between these issues, where possible,
on the basis that the reasoning will relate to (1) the issue of ‘corporate person
investor’ where the claim involves the use of a holding company, whether or not
by a minority shareholder, so as to facilitate a claim where it might not otherwise
be possible, or to (2) the issue of ‘minority shareholder interest’ where the claim
has been brought by a minority shareholder of the domestic investment, thus
necessarily raising the issue of the nature and scope of the claimant’s interest as a
minority shareholder.
Issue 1: “corporate person investor” – restrictive approach134
Restrictive approach to claims by foreign holding companies, indicated by:
(a) Flexible use of veil-piercing or of an indirect control test or of a substantial connection text in order to preclude jurisdiction/ admissibility;
(b) Refusal of a claim by a foreign company that is owned and likely
controlled by nationals of the host state;

134. Modeled on: (1) Tokios, ibid (minority reasons on jurisdiction, which adopted a fexible
approach to veil-piercing under the ICSID Convention where the claim was brought in
efect by nationals of the respondent state, in spite of the absence of an express origin-ofcapital test in the BIT); (2) Aguas, ibid (minority reasons on jurisdiction, which refused
to allow a claim based on a fexible approach to indirect control in the context of recent
corporate restructuring that was likely infuenced by the prospect of a BIT claim); and (3)
Loewen Group Inc and Raymond L Loewen v United States of America (2003), 42 ILM 811
(International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) [Loewen] (which adopted a
requirement that the investor maintain continuous foreign nationality until fnal resolution
of claim and which, according to Tokios majority, in efect lifted the corporate veil in order to
look behind the claimant’s corporate holding vehicle).
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(c) Refusal of a claim by a shareholder whose investment in the host
state is owned by an intermediary company of a third state.
Note: Refusal of a claim by a foreign company or natural person whose ownership
of the investment extends through a chain of companies running from the host
state to the home state, even where it does not extend into any third state or end
in the host state, nevertheless does qualify as a restrictive approach in (b) above.
Note: An award is non-classifable where the issue is dealt with expressly and
specifcally in the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis
of the tribunal’s reasoning. On the present issue, a treaty does not satisfy this
threshold unless it expressly and specifcally precludes claims by foreign holding
companies on the basis of their particular ownership and control or it expressly
and specifcally provides for application of the relevant test outlined in (a) above.
Issue 2: “natural person investor” – expansive approach135
Flexible approach to claims by natural persons, indicated by:
(a) Allowance of a claim against the only state of which the claimant is a citizen;
OR
(b) Allowance of a claim against a state of which the claimant is a citizen
without conformation that the citizenship upon which the claim is based is
dominant and efective;
OR
(c) Allowance of a claim based on a fexible application of the requirement
for foreign nationality as customarily applied to natural persons.
Note: An award is non-classifable where the issue is dealt with expressly and
specifcally in the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis
of the tribunal’s reasoning.
135. Modeled on: (1) Waguih Elie George Siag and Clorinda Vecchi v Te Arab Republic of Egypt
(2007), ICSID Case No ARB/05/5 (International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes) (which allowed claim to proceed even though the claimant used Egyptian
nationality to make the investment); and (2) Bayview Irrigation District et al v United
Mexican States (2007), ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/05/1 (International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes) (in which the respondent state submitted that some of
the claimants were Mexican nationals). See also Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v Guatemala)
Second Phase, Order of 6 April 1955, [1955] ICJ Rep 4.
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Issue 2: “natural person investor” – restrictive approach136
Strict approach to claims by natural persons, indicated by:
(a) Refusal of a claim against the only state of which the claimant is a citizen;
OR
(b) Refusal of a claim against a state of which the claimant is a citizen following
confrmation that the citizenship upon which the claim is based is not dominant
and efective;
OR
(c) Refusal of a claim based on a strict application of the requirement for foreign nationality as customarily applied to natural persons.
Note: An award is non-classifable where the issue is dealt with expressly and
specifcally in the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis
of the tribunal’s reasoning.

136. Modeled on: (1) Hussein Nuaman Soufraki v United Arab Emirates (2004), 17 WTAM 129
(International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (which refused jurisdiction on the
basis that the claimant was not shown to be a national of the home state, or that this nationality
was not the claimant’s dominant and efective nationality, at the time of the claim); and (2)
Loewen, supra note 134 (which required the claimant to maintain continuous foreign nationality
from the origin of dispute until the conclusion (rather than the initiation) of an international
claim). See also Anthony C Sinclair, “Nationality Requirements for Investors in ICSID
Arbitration: Te Award in Soufraki v. Te United Arab Emirates” Case Comment (2004), online:
Investment Treaty Arbitration <http://italaw.com/documents/CommentonSoufraki.pdf>.
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Issue 3: “concept of investment” – expansive approach137
Flexible approach to the concept of investment, indicated:
(a) Where a claim is under the ICSID Convention, non-application of the
Fedax criteria, including by focusing primarily on the defnition of investment
in the BIT or other investment treaty (also known as a subjective theory of
investment under ICSID);
OR
(b) Where the claim is under the ICSID Convention, liberal application of
the Fedax criteria to include as ‘investment’ any activities that are standalone and that go beyond conventional FDI project activities, in line with “the
liberal movement, favourable to an extension of the jurisdiction of ICSID
tribunals to every kind of economic rights”;138
OR
(c) Whether or not the claim is under the ICSID Convention, rejection of
the requirement for an actual transfer of capital into the respondent state as
a feature of investment (unless there are extenuating circumstances such as
corrupt practices that apparently blocked an investor from doing so);
OR
(d) Whether or not the claim is under the ICSID Convention, inclusion of
non-traditional categories of ownership within the concept of “investment”,
e.g., ownership of a sales ofce, market share, or corporate governance rights
in a contract, where the asset is not part of conventional FDI project activities.
137. Modeled on: (1) MTD Equity Sdn Bhd v Republic of Chile (2004), 44 ILM 91 (International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) [MTD] (which rejected the Fedax requirement
that an investment, to qualify under the ICSID Convention, must contribute to the host
economy and further rejected any requirement for a transfer of capital into the respondent state
in association with an investment); and (2) Salini Costruttori SpA and Italstrade SpA v Kingdom
of Morocco (2001), 42 ILM 609 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes)
(which adopted a fexible application of the Fedax criteria regarding a construction contract
that lacked a long-term contribution to the respondent state economy). See also Farouk Yala,
“Te Notion of ‘Investment’ in ICSID Case Law: A Drifting Jurisdictional Requirement?”
(2005) 22:2 J Int’l Arb 105 at 106, 110; Martin Hunter & Alexei Barbuk, “Refections on the
Defnition of an Investment” in Gerald Aksen et al, eds, Global refections on international law,
commerce and dispute resolution: Liber Amicorum in Honor of Robert Briner (Paris: International
Chamber of Commerce, 2005) 381 at 383.
138. Yala, ibid at 108.

262

(2012) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

Note: An award is non-classifable where the issue is dealt with expressly and
specifcally in the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis of
the tribunal’s reasoning. On the present issue, a treaty that expressly and clearly
incorporates the relevant asset that is included by the tribunal as part of a
non-traditional conception of investment will satisfy this threshold unless the
claim is an ICSID claim and either (a) or (b) above apply.
Issue 3: “concept of investment” – restrictive approach139
Restrictive approach to the concept of investment, indicated:
(a) Where a claim is under the ICSID Convention, strict application of the
Fedax criteria (i.e., rejection of a subjective theory focusing primarily on
the defnition of investment in the BIT or other investment treaty) to limit
‘investment’ to conventional FDI project activities or otherwise to deny a
claim;
OR
(b) Whether or not the claim is under the ICSID Convention, adoption of
a requirement for an actual transfer of capital into the respondent state as a
feature of investment;
OR
(c) Whether or not the claim is under the ICSID Convention, exclusion of nontraditional categories of ownership where they are not linked directly to
conventional FDI project activities.
Note: An award is non-classifable where the issue is dealt with expressly and
specifcally in the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis
of the tribunal’s reasoning.

139. Modeled on: (1) Malaysian Historical Salvors Sdn, Bhd v Malaysia (2007), ICSID Case No
ARB/05/10 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (which denied
jurisdiction based on the application of Fedax criterion that investment must contribute
to the host economy); and (2) Joy Mining Machinery Ltd v Arab Republic of Egypt (2004),
44 ILM 73 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (which denied
jurisdiction on basis that performance guarantees given by the claimant to an Egyptian
state entity were sales contracts on normal commercial terms that did not rise to the level of
investment activity). See also Yulia Andreeva, “Te Tribunal in Malaysian Historical Salvors
v. Malaysia Adopts a Restrictive Interpretation of the Term ‘Investment’” (2008) 25:4 J Int’l
Arb 503.
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Issue 4: “minority shareholder interest” – expansive approach140
Flexible approach to claims by minority shareholders, indicated by:
(a) Allowance of a claim by a minority shareholder without limiting the
claim to the shareholder’s interest in the value and disposition of the shares
(as opposed to interests of the domestic frm as a whole);
OR
(b) Allowance of a claim by a minority shareholder where the treaty does not
clearly and specifcally allow it.
Note: An award is non-classifable where the issue is dealt with expressly and
specifcally in the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis
of the tribunal’s reasoning. On (b) above, most treaties expressly and specifcally
allow claims by minority shareholders by defning investment to include ownership
of stock or shares in a domestic company.
Issue 4: “minority shareholder interest” – restrictive approach141
Narrow approach to claims by minority shareholders, indicated by:
(a) Limitation of such a claim to the extent of the claimant’s minority shareholder interest in the value and disposition of the shares;
OR
(b) Preclusion of a claim by minority shareholder due to a lack of control over
the investment (in circumstances where, for example, the treaty does not defne
investment to include ownership of stock or shares in a domestic company).

140. Modeled on GAMI Investments, Inc v Te Government of the United Mexican States (2004),
44 ILM 545 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) [GAMI] (which
allowed a claim by a minority shareholder on behalf of the domestic frm rather than on
behalf of the shareholder’s interests alone, despite submissions to the contrary by the home
state as well as the respondent state). See Stanimir A Alexandrov, “Te ‘Baby Boom’ of
Treaty-Based Arbitrations and the Jurisdiction of ICSID Tribunals: Shareholders as ‘Investors’
and Jurisdiction Ratione Temporis” (2005) 4:1 Law & Prac Int’l Courts & Trib 19 at 33;
Christoph Schreuer, “Shareholder Protection in International Investment Law” in PierreMarie Dupuy et al, eds, Common Values in International Law (Kehl: NP Engel Verlag, 2005)
601 at 608.
141. Modeled on the position argued by both the home state and the respondent state in GAMI, ibid.
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Note: An award is non-classifable where the issue is dealt with expressly and
specifcally in the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis
of the tribunal’s reasoning.
Issue 5: “permissibility of investment” – expansive approach142
Flexible approach to approval/permissibility of investment, indicated by:
(a) Evident onus on the respondent state to show that an investment was
not afrmatively approved or was based on corrupt practices.
Note: An award is non-classifable where the issue is dealt with expressly and
specifcally in the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis
of the tribunal’s reasoning.
Issue 5: “permissibility of investment” – restrictive approach143
Restrictive approach to approval/permissibility of “investment,” indicated by:
(a) Evident onus on the investor to show that an investment was afrmatively approved or was not based on corrupt practices.
Note: An award is non-classifable where the issue is dealt with expressly and
specifcally in the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis
of the tribunal’s reasoning.

142. Modeled on Metalclad Corporation v Te United Mexican States (2000), 40 ILM 36
(International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes). See also Mexico v Metalclad
Corp, 2001 BCSC 664, 89 BCLR (3d) 359 and TSA Spectrum de Argentina SA v Argentine
Republic (2008), ICSID Case No ARB/5/5 (International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes) (in both of which the respondent state raised objections that the
claimant engaged in corrupt activities).
143. Modeled on: (1) World Duty Free Company Limited v Republic of Kenya (2006), ICSID
Case No ARB/00/7 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (which,
although an investment contract case, declined jurisdiction on the basis that the claimant
engaged in corrupt practices and did not come to the arbitration with clean hands); and (2)
Yaung Chi Oo Trading Pte Ltd v Government of the Union of Myanmar (2003), 42 ILM 540
(International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (which declined jurisdiction
on the basis that there was no express subsequent act of approval by the respondent state for
investments that pre-existed the relevant treaty).
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Issue 6: “parallel claims” – expansive approach144
Flexible approach to parallel claims, indicated by:
(a) Allowance of treaty claim in face of:
1. A treaty-based duty to exhaust (or other claim-related condition
such as a time-limited duty to pursue) local remedies which clearly
was not satisfed by the claimant, whether or not the claim relates
to a contract;
2. A contractually agreed dispute settlement clause that was consented
to by the claimant or a closely related company (“closely related”
meaning a company owned and likely controlled by the investor),
where the claim appears to relate to a contractual dispute but
regardless of whether any claim was brought in the contractually
agreed forum and regardless of whether the treaty claim is based on
an umbrella clause;
3. A fork-in-the-road clause, where the claimant or a closely related
company has brought a parallel claim via the relevant path of
the fork-in-the-road (i.e., in a domestic court or a domestic or

144. Modeled on: (1) MTD, supra note 137 (which rejected the argument, based on litigation
in domestic courts, that a BIT fork-in-the-road clause barred the claim); (2) Occidental
Petroleum Company v Republic of Ecuador (No 2) (2008), IIC 337 (International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes) (which required an express waiver in an investment
contract [that provided for an exclusive dispute settlement forum] of the investor’s right to
resort to BIT arbitration); (3) Biwater Gauf (Tanzania) Ltd v United Republic of Tanzania
(2008), IIC 330 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) [Biwater]
(dissenting reasons, which rejected the majority’s fnding that a dispute over a performance
bond should have been resolved via contract arbitration); (4) Rumeli Telekom AS and Telsim
Mobil Telekomikasyon Hizmetleri AS v Republic of Kazakhstan (2008), IIC 344 (International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (which found a breach of fair and equitable
treatment based on the respondent state’s termination of the contract without notice and its
suspension of the contract to address alleged breaches on the part of the claimant, without
a requirement for the claimant to resort to the contractually agreed forum for dispute
settlement); and (5) CME Republic BV v Te Czech Republic (2001), 14 WTAM 288 (United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law) (which adopted a fexible approach to
parallel BIT claims based on a strict approach to the doctrine of lis pendens). See also Christer
Söderlund, “Lis Pendens, Res Judicata and the Issue of Parallel Judicial Proceedings” (2005)
22 J Int’l Arb 301; Bernardo M Cremades & Ignacio Madalena, “Parallel Proceedings
in International Arbitration” (2008) 24 Arb Int’l 507 at 516, 522; and Gilles Cuniberti,
“Parallel Litigation and Foreign Investment Dispute Settlement” (2006) 21 ICSID Rev 381.
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international tribunal, according to the relevant path of the forkin-the-road) and the claim arises from the same underlying factual
dispute; or
4. An actual claim pursuant to another treaty, arising from the same
factual dispute.
Note: Allowance of a treaty claim in any of these circumstances will typically
be based on the strict application of the lis pendens or res judicata rule, using
a “triple identity” test to require that (i) the parties, (ii) the cause of action, and
(iii) the dispute must all be identical before a parallel treaty claim can be stayed.
Issue 6: “parallel claims” – restrictive approach145
Restrictive approach to parallel claims, indicated by:
(a) Refusal or delay (in order to permit the resolution of aspects of the dispute in another forum) of a treaty claim in face of:
1. A duty to exhaust (or other claim-related condition such as a
time-limited duty to pursue) local remedies which clearly was not
satisfed by the claimant, whether or not the claim relates to a
contract;
2. A contractually agreed dispute settlement clause, where the claim
appears to relate to the contract but regardless of whether or not any
claim was brought in the contractually agreed forum and regardless of
whether the treaty claim is based on an umbrella clause;
3. A fork-in-the-road clause, where the claimant or a closely related
company has brought a parallel claim via the relevant path of the
145. Modeled on: (1) Loewen, supra note 134 (which incorporated an implied obligation to resort
to local remedies as a component of the minimum standard of treatment in the context of a
judicial decision); (2) Generation Ukraine, Inc v Ukraine (2003), 44 ILM 404 (International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (which incorporated an implied obligation to
resort to local remedies based on the conclusion that, for an investor to establish that conduct
by the state is tantamount to expropriation, the investor must have made reasonable eforts
to obtain a correction domestically); (3) Biwater, ibid (majority reasons, which found that a
dispute over a performance bond should have been resolved via contract arbitration); and (4)
Azinian (Robert) et al v United Mexican States (1999), 39 ILM 537 (International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes) (which required the claimant, who had resorted to local
courts, to show denial of justice on the part of local courts). See also McLachlan, Shore &
Weiniger, supra note 133 at 184-85, 188-89; Christoph Schreuer, “Calvo’s Grandchildren:
Te Return of Local Remedies in Investment Arbitration” (2005) 4:1 Law & Prac Int’l
Courts & Trib 1.
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fork-in-the-road and the claim arises from the same underlying
factual dispute; or
4. An actual claim pursuant to another treaty, arising from the same
factual dispute.
Note: Refusal or delay of a treaty claim in any of these circumstances may be
based on a fexible approach to lis pendens or res judicata, common law doctrines
of issue estoppel or forum non conveniens, abuse of process, incorporation of an
efective duty to resort to local remedies as a component of a substantive standard,
or the rationale that a fork-in-the-road clause entails a choice by the claimant not
only of forum but also of available remedies and causes of action (i.e., the investor
(and closely related companies) can choose to bring either a treaty claim or a
claim before a domestic court or a domestic or international tribunal, but not
both).
Note: An award is non-classifable where the issue is dealt with expressly and
specifcally in the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis
of the tribunal’s reasoning.
Issue 7: “scope of Most Favoured Nation (MNF) treatment” – expansive
approach146
Flexible approach to MFN treatment, indicated by:
(a) Extension of MFN treatment to non-substantive/treatment-oriented
provisions of other treaties (e.g., so as to include dispute settlement provisions of other treaties).
Note: An award is non-classifable where the issue is dealt with expressly and
specifcally in the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis
of the tribunal’s reasoning. On the present issue, this threshold is crossed where
the treaty states explicitly that the MFN treatment clause either does or does not
apply to the dispute settlement (or other non-substantive) provisions in other
146. Modeled on: (1) Mafezini (Emilio Agustín) v Kingdom of Spain (2000), 124 ILR 9
(International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes); and (2) Siemens AG
v Argentine Republic (2004), 44 ILM 138 (International Centre for the Settlement
of Investment Disputes) (both of which also extended the scope of Most Favoured
Nation treatment to dispute settlement provisions of other investment treaties). See also
Mara Valenti, “Te Most Favoured Nation Clause in BITs as a Basis for Jurisdiction in
Foreign Investor-Host State Arbitration” (2008) 24:3 Arb Int’l 447; Emmanuel Gaillard,
“Establishing Jurisdiction Trough a Most-Favoured-Nation Clause” (2005) 233:105 NYLJ.
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treaties. If the treaty makes a more general statement, for example that the MFN
clause applies to “all matters” or to matters of “treatment” in other treaties, then
this does not satisfy this threshold for an express and specifc resolution of the
issue.
Issue 7: “scope of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment” – restrictive
approach147
Restrictive approach to MFN treatment, indicated by:
(a) Refusal to extend MFN treatment to substantive/treatment-oriented
provisions of other treaties (e.g., so as to include dispute settlement provisions
of other treaties).

147. Modeled on: (1) Plama Consortium Limited v Republic of Bulgaria (2005), 44 ILM 721
(International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes); and (2) Salini Costruttori SpA
and Italstrade SpA v Te Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (2004), 44 ILM 573 (International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (both of which declined to extend the scope
of MFN treatment to dispute settlement provisions of other treaties, barring a clear intention
to do so by the states parties). See also McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 133 at
254-57; Yannick Radi, “Te Application of the Most-Favoured-Nation Clause to the Dispute
Settlement Provisions of Bilateral Investment Treaties: Domesticating the ‘Trojan Horse’”
(2007) 18:4 EJIL 757.

